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ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT-HELD INFORMATION IN
THE COMPUTER AGE: APPLYING LEGAL DOCTRINE
TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
MATTHEW D. BUNKER,* SIGMAN L. SPLICHAL,**
BILL F. CHAMBERLIN,*** AND LINDA M. PERRY****
I. INTRODUCTION
N a democratic system based on popular sovereignty, citizens have
an interest in the workings of their government. The basic data of
those government operations are official records and documents. The
federal government,' the fifty states, and the District of Columbia2
have shown their commitment to the concept of public access to gov-
ernment-held information. All have statutes that allow varying de-
grees of access to government records.' Florida, a leader in the
tradition of open government, enacted a public records law4 that pro-
vided a model for a nationwide effort that resulted in similar legisla-
tion in many states.5
The fundamental concept of open government often conflicts with
government's desire to keep information secret, either to preserve pri-
* B.S., 1979; M.S., 1989, Kansas State University; J.D., 1985, University of Kansas;
Ph.D, Candidate 1993, University of Florida.
** Assistant Professor of Communications, University of Miami; B.S., 1970; M.A., 1976;
Ph.D., Candidate 1993, University of Florida.
*** Joseph L. Brechner Eminent Scholar of Mass Communication; Director, Brechner Cen-
ter for Freedom of Information, University of Florida; B.A., 1967, University of Washington;
M.A., 1968, University of Wisconsin; Ph.D., 1977, University of Washington.
**** B.S., 1987; M.A., 1989; Ph.D., Candidate 1993, University of Florida.
The authors would like to thank the following individuals who provided significant research
assistance in the preparation of this Article: Michael Nyenhuis, Morgan Gaynor, and David
Switalski. Expenses for this project were funded in part by the Brechner Center for Freedom of
Information, College of Journalism and Communications, University of Florida.
1. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
2. See REPORTERS Comm. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, TAPPING OFFICIALS' SECRETS, A
STATE OPEN GOVERNMENT COMPENDIUs (1989) (reproducing, with annotations, the various free-
dom of information acts and public records laws) [hereinafter "TAPPING OFFICIALS' SECRETS"].
3. Id.
4. FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (1991). The Public Records Law was enacted in 1909 and was one of
the first in the nation. Ch. 5942, Laws of Fla. (1909).
5. FLORIDA JT. LEuS. INFO. TECH'Y RESOURCE CoMM., FLoRIDA'S INFORMtATION POLICY:
PROB.EMS AND ISSUES IN THE INFORMATION AGE 28 (1989) [hereinafter FLORIDA'S INFORMATION
POLICY].
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vacy, to maintain national security, or, for one of many other pur-
poses, some more valid than others. This has resulted in a substantial
body of case law that has grown out of efforts to balance these com-
peting interests. 6
The use of computers to maintain public records has complicated
the situation. 7 Many open records statutes were written when govern-
ment information consisted of paper records stored in file cabinets.
The use of computers to create, manipulate, store, and disseminate
these records is changing how-and even whether-governments pro-
vide public access to their records.
This Article will examine the constitutional and statutory bases for
access to government information. It will explore some of the practi-
cal obstacles to obtaining access to government records held in com-
puters. The Article will then describe the legal issues specific to
computerized government records and will discuss how courts at all
levels have dealt with those issues. Next, the Article will examine the
tension between access to records and concerns about personal pri-
vacy. Although privacy concerns are implicated in many contexts in
this Article, specific discussion will be reserved until the final substan-
tive section. In conclusion, the Article will offer guidelines the authors
believe will help ensure access to computerized records. Throughout,
the focus will be on access both at the federal level and in Florida.
6. The conflict between access and privacy is discussed at length, infra notes 286-388 and
accompanying text.
7. The issue of access to computerized records has been addressed by a number of com-
mentators, including Eric M. Freedman, Freedom of Information and the First Amendment in a
Bureaucratic Age, 49 BRooK. L. REv. 835 (1983); Patti A. Goldman, The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act Needs No Amendment To Ensure Access to Electronic Records, 7 GOV'T lIFo. Q. 389
(1990); Jamie A. Grodsky, The Freedom of Information Act in the Electronic Age: The Statute
Is Not User Friendly, 31 JuajasmTics J. 17 (1990); Patrick L. "Booter" Imhof & Edwin A.
Levine, Impact of the Information Age on Access and Dissemination of Government Informa-
tion in Florida, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 635 (1986); Megan A. Kendall, Current Development,
AFSCME v. County of Cook: Access to Information Beyond Reach as Computer Tape Length-
ens Bureaucratic Red Tape, 3 SoFrwARE L.J. 755 (1990); Leo T. Sorokin, The Computerization
of Government Information: Does It Circumvent Public Access Under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and the Depository Library Program?, 24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 267 (1990); Sol
Villasana, The People's Right To Know in the Age of Electronic Information, BARRiSTER, Fall
1990, at 61. See also Jerry Berman, The Right To Know: Public Access to Electronic Public
Information, 3 SoTWAE L.J. 491 (1989); Henry Perritt, Jr., Electronic Acquisition and Release
of Federal Agency Information: Analysis of Recommendations Adopted by the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 41 Anmw. L. Rv. 253 (1989); Sandra D. Scott, Computer
Technology v. Laws on Access (unpublished paper presented to the Association for Education in
Journalism and Mass Communication, annual convention, Boston, Mass., Aug. 1991); Sigman
L. Splichal & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Fight for Access to Government Records Round Two:
Enter the Computer (unpublished paper presented to the International Communication Associa-
tion, annual meeting, Miami, Fla., May 1992) (on file with authors).
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
II. AccEss TO REcoRDs: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Access to government-held information is grounded in the Ameri-
can political ideal of self-government. The Framers of the United
States Constitution said self-governing people should be well-in-
formed about the workings of government to make intelligent political
choices.' In a discussion of the First Amendment, James Madison
said: "The right of freely examining public characters and measures,
and of free communication thereon, is the only effectual guardian of
every other right. . . ." Thomas Jefferson's belief in the importance
of an informed electorate, and a press that is free to inform it, is well
documented. Jefferson said that because the informed "opinion of
the people" is the basis of government, 0 he would prefer "newspa-
pers without a government" over "government without newspa-
pers."I
The Framers, despite their commitment to self-government, did not
give much guidance as to how the press was to go about informing the
people-or as to how the people were to go about informing them-
selves-about the operations of government. Nonetheless, the Fram-
ers did provide some mechanisms for holding representatives
accountable to the people. There are constitutional mandates for ac-
cess to government information, although they are narrow and spe-
cific. For example, the Constitution requires the legislative and
executive branches to report certain information about their opera-
tions. 12 Each house is required to keep and publish a "Journal of its
Proceedings."' 3 However, each house may determine for itself what
might "require Secrecy" and, as a result, be kept off the record. 4 In
8. Only narrow traditions of openness existed in the early years of the Republic. See gener-
ally Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Freedom of the Press-American Style, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY:
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 214, 238-39 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1977). As
Congress opened its doors to the public and the press in the 1780s and 1790s, both houses wrote
rules under which they might operate behind closed doors if the need arose. See Introduction in
JoURNALS OF CONGRESS, 1775-1788; LEwis DESC-ILER, CoNsTTUTIoN, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 564, 82d CONG., 2d SEss. (1953).
9. WrriNis OF J7 MEs MADISON 398 (1806), reprinted in Note, Access to Official Informa-
tion: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209, 212 (1952).
10. See Letter from Jefferson to Edward Carrington, Jan. 16, 1787, in TyHo PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 48-49 [hereinafter PAPERS OF JEFFERSON].
11. Id. But Jefferson also believed that the guarantee for a free press should not protect the
press from liability for publishing false facts. Letter from Jefferson to Madison, July 31, 1788,
in PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 13:442-43. See also LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE
OF A FREE PRESS 250-81 (1985), for a discussion of Jefferson's belief in state prosecutions for the
press's seditious libels.
12. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; id. § 9, cl. 7.
13. Id. § 5, cl. 3.
14. Id.
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addition, Congress is required to publish "from time to time" a "reg-
ular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money .... ."15 The President is required to report to Congress
"Information on the State of the Union.'
16
Except for these narrow exceptions for specific reports, the Consti-
tution does not directly mandate public access to government infor-
mation.1 7 The United States Supreme Court has not explicitly found,
except in criminal trials,'" an implied constitutional right of access to
government proceedings or records. Although the First Amendment
does not directly mention access, some have suggested it mandates ac-
cess to government information in some circumstances. 19
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment says "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."20
The First Amendment is often recognized as continuing a funda-
mental personal right of conscience and expression.2' Indeed, the
clauses protecting the fundamental rights of individuals are enumer-
ated first. The First Amendment is viewed as "the repository of...
self-governing powers," '22 as it provides a peaceful means for political
and social change through public discussion.
15. Id. § 9, cl. 7. But see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (federal taxpayer
did not have standing to claim Congress had failed to require detailed reports of Central Intelli-
gence Agency expenditures). In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger suggested that
taxpayers could never have standing and that "the subject matter is committed to the surveil-
lance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process." Id. at 179.
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
17. See infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text discussing cases asserting a right to access
of government information.
18. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 563-75 (1980), for a short sum-
mary of the Anglo-American history of the right to attend criminal trials.
19. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONST. amend 1.
21. See generally LEvy, supra note 11; Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amend-
ment Theory, 1977 Am. B. FOUND. Rs. J. 523; Justice Black and First Amendment "Abso-
lutes". A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549 (1962) (transcript of interview conducted by
Professor Edmond Cahn).
22. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 H.Axv. L. Rlv. 1, 11 (1965).
A CCESS TO INFORMA TION
1. Self-Government
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the primary
function of the First Amendment is to protect the freedoms necessary
for self-government. Justice Louis Brandeis in 1927 is said to have
given "the principle its classic formulation":,3
Those who won our independence believed ... that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government .... Believing in the power of
reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form.
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed34
In 1931 a majority of the Court said the First Amendment provides
"the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that govern-
ment may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes
may be obtained by lawful means .... -25 Justice William J. Brennan
summarized the principle succinctly in his opinion for the Court in
Garrison v. Louisiana,26 saying that "speech concerning public affairs
is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." 27
The Court has extended considerable First Amendment protection
to discussion of public affairs by individuals and the press. 21 Yet the
Court has seemed reluctant to recognize a concomitant right to gov-
23. As characterized by Justice Brennan in his opinion for a unanimous Court in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
24. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
25. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). See also Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24 (1971), where the Court held:
The constitutional right of free expression .. is designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to
what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
In addition, the Court held in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). that the First
Amendment is designed to "assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."
26. 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (overturning criminal libel conviction for criticizing the official con-
duct of state judges in Louisiana).
27. Id. at 74-75.
28. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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ernment-held information that the public has a duty to discuss.29 First
Amendment scholars, as well as some Supreme Court justices and fed-
eral judges, have articulated theories that might support such a right.
Political philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn said the First Amend-
ment's protection is concerned with "a public power, a governmental
responsibility." 30 In the Meiklejohnian view, the First Amendment
gives absolute protection to expression on self-government issues be-
cause citizens need information about their government to vote intelli-
gently I.I
One way citizens inform themselves about their government is
through their surrogate, the press. Professor Vincent Blasi has said
that the First Amendment provides a "checking value" on abuse of
official power in government.3 2 According to Blasi, the First Amend-
ment protects the press in its watchdog role-reporting on the actions
of public officials to keep government responsive and accountable.
The press gives citizens the information they need "about what gov-
ernment officials are doing," such as "the official actions revealed in
the Pentagon Papers.""3
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that information itself is im-
portant to public discussion, 34 but has not articulated a right of access
to that information.35 The Court, however, has recognized a right of
the public to receive information that is already in the hands of the
media and others.36
2. A Right To Receive Information
In 1936, the Supreme Court first identified a right to receive infor-
mation in Grosjean v. American Press Co. 37 The Louisiana Legisla-
ture had imposed a "license tax" on the gross advertising receipts of
large newspapers. The Court held that the tax was unconstitutional
because "it abridges the freedom of the press." ' 3 A free press is "a
vital source of public information," and "informed public opinion is
29. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
30. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245,
255.
31. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 6
(1948).
32. Blasi, supra note 21, at 528.
33. Id. at 553.
34. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 52-73.
36. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
37. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
38. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 251.
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the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment." 3 9 Thus, the
tax would infringe on "the natural right" of the people to "acquire
information about their common interests." 4
The Court has reiterated, in a variety of contexts, the idea that "the
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. ' 41
Many consider Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council42 the seminal "right to receive" case. In that 1976
decision, the Court struck down a Virginia statute forbidding pharma-
cists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs. 43 Justice Black-
mun, writing for the majority, said the free flow of information about
commercial matters was necessary to assure informed public decision-
making." The protection of the First Amendment, Blackmun rea-
soned, extends not only to the speaker, but to the recipient of the
communication .4  Although Virginia State Board dealt with commer-
cial speech, the majority opinion made it clear that the constitutional
protection for receipt of information would apply with even more
force when more directly related to self-government and public pol-
icy. 46
In 1982 the Supreme Court emphasized the connection between self-
government and the right to receive information in Board of Educa-
tion v. Pico.47 That case involved a school board-ordered removal of
books from secondary school libraries after the board characterized
the books as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semtic [sic], and
just plain filthy . . . . " Justice Brennan, writing for a three-justice
plurality, emphasized the First Amendment's role in assuring wide-
39. Id. at 250. However, the Court also has found that "the press does not have a monop-
oly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten," Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782 (1978),
and the right of the press is no greater than the right of the public. See generally Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Houchins v. KQED Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978);
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
40. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 243.
41. In addition to cases discussed in the text, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) (relying on the right to free access to ideas and privacy rights in the home to hold that
states may not make the private possession of obscene material by an adult a crime). See also
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (finding the right to receive information and ideas
insufficient to overturn a 1952 law making Communists ineligible to receive visas); Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (relying on a right to "receive information and ideas" to
invalidate a 1962 law under which the post office screened foreign mail and detained "commun-
ist propaganda").
42. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
43. Id. at 773.
44. Id. at 765.
45. Id. at 756.
46. Id. at 765 n.19.
47. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
48. Id. at 857.
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spread dissemination of ideas and information. 49 "[Tihe State may
not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the
spectrum of available knowledge." 0 Moreover, the right to receive,
according to Justice Brennan, is a "necessary predicate" to citizen
participation in government and the exercise of other constitutional
rights."'
The First Amendment right to receive information has been closely
tied to effective self-government in a number of cases. It thus suggests
some constitutional justification for access to government records. Al-
though the right to receive has not been extended to government re-
cords, the same concerns that drive its application by the Court in
other areas could logically serve as grounds to require some form of
access to government information.
3. A Limited Right of Access to Government-Held Information
The First Amendment has been interpreted by the Court to protect
the right to publish information about public issues that comes into
the media's possession. 52 Except for judicial proceedings and records,
however, the Court has not articulated a constitutional right of access
to information that the government produces and holds.
The Court first confronted the issue of a First Amendment right of
access to government-controlled information 5 in the 1974 companion
cases of Pell v. Procunier4 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co."5 In
both cases, the Court upheld regulations prohibiting press interviews
with prison inmates. In rejecting the First Amendment claims of the
press, the Court said the media could be denied access to prisoners
because the public also was denied access in order to control the
prison populations.16 Justice Potter Stewart, in his opinion for the Pell
Court, said the First Amendment prohibits government interference
with the press. It "does not, however, require government to accord
49. Id. at 866.
50. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
51. Id. at 867.
52. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 28.
53. The Court considered newsgathering issues in 1972 in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), a case involving reporters' claims that requiring them to appear and testify before grand
juries about their confidential news sources would burden newsgathering. It rejected a qualified
privilege not to testify. Id. The Court recognized that newsgathering has some First Amendment
protection. Id. at 681. However, it rejected the claim that the press has a constitutional right of
special access to information not available to the public generally. Id. at 684.
54. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
55. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
56. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 846-47; Pell, 417 U.S. 817.
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the press special access to information not shared by members of the
public generally." 57
In one limited domain, the Court has recognized a constitutional
right of access to information. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia8 the Court held in a seven-to-one opinion that the First
Amendment requires that a criminal trial "must be open to the pub-
lic," absent an overriding interest. 9 Chief Justice Burger's plurality
opinion, joined only by Justices White and Stevens, based this implicit
right on the fact that criminal trials historically have been open to the
public, 60 and that openness is necessary to the effective functioning of
the criminal justice system. 6'
Richmond Newspapers sets out a number of benefits that result
from open trials. Openness "gave assurance that the proceedings were
conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the mis-
conduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partial-
ity. "62 Moreover, open trials, particularly in the case of especially
heinous crimes, had a "significant community therapeutic value" by
providing a catharsis for an area outraged by a crime. 63
Following Richmond, the Supreme Court expanded the First
Amendment right of access to include jury voir dire4 and preliminary
hearings. 65 In the 1986 case concerning preliminary hearings, Press
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court [Press-Enterprise IIJ, the Court ex-
plicitly adopted the two-step inquiry suggested in Richmond for deter-
mining if a First Amendment right of access exists. 66 The first question
was "whether the place and process have historically been open to the
press and the general public." 6 7 Second, the Court asked "whether
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question."6 This inquiry, sometimes called the
57. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834.
58. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Richmond Newspapers appealed an order closing a murder trial
that was being tried for the fourth time after two mistrials, including one due to pretrial public-
ity, and a conviction reversal based on improperly admitted evidence. The trial was concluded
and the defendant acquitted before the appeal reached the Court. Id. at 559-63.
59. Id. at 581 (Justice Powell did not participate in the case).
60. Id. at 563-75.
61. Id. at 569-77.
62. Id. at 569.
63. Id. at 571.
64. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. ("Press-Enterprise I"), 464 U.S. 501
(1984).
65. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. ("Press-Enterprise If"), 478 U.S. 1
(1986).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id.
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functional test, asks whether access enhances the governmental proc-
ess, for example, by contributing to either perceived or actual fairness
in a proceeding. 9
The Richmond line of cases provides weak support for a First
Amendment right of access to government records. Those cases dealt
only with proceedings in criminal courts and not with records held by
other government agencies. Moreover, the first prong of the Press-
Enterprise II test for First Amendment access-a tradition of open-
ness-is often arguably lacking when it comes to government records.
However, some courts following Richmond and its progeny have sug-
gested that the positive value of openness-the functional prong-
may be sufficient to justify a First Amendment right of access.70 That
right of access may exist independently of any tradition of openness.
For example, the Second Circuit in Application of the Herald Co.
found the functional justification sufficient to declare a First Amend-
ment right of access to pretrial suppression hearings. 71 The court rea-
soned that although pretrial suppression hearings did not have a
tradition of openness, the functional justification was sufficient when
"public observation serves important public purposes," such as scru-
tiny of the criminal justice system. 72 Moreover, the Second Circuit
found that a majority of Supreme Court justices in Richmond and its
progeny had accepted the functional justification, standing alone, as a
sufficient ground to support constitutional access rights. 73
If the functional justification can serve as an independent basis for
inferring First Amendment access rights, that principle could well be
extended to a right of access to government records in general. How-
ever, at present, whether records are available is dependent upon stat-
utory law. It is to that statutory realm that we now turn.
B. A Statutory Approach to Access
1. The Federal Government
A gradual trend in our nation's history of increasing access to infor-
mation held by the government was countered in the 1940s by secrecy
concerns of World War II and Cold War tensions. 74 Although the
69. Id. at9.
70. See generally Application of the Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 97.
73. Id.
74. Barrett, supra note 8, at 238; Comment, The Righi of the Press To Gather Information
After Branzburg and PelI, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 167-68 (1975).
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1946 Federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA)75 recognized the
public nature of government records, the APA also gave the executive
branch broad discretion in the disclosure of government records.7 6
Section 3 of the APA allowed agencies to determine what information
"requiring secrecy in the public interest" should be exempted from
disclosure, and whether the person requesting the record was "prop-
erly and directly concerned" with the information.7 7 The APA lacked
a remedy for wrongfully withholding information. Federal agencies
and the courts came to use the APA "more as a withholding statute
than a disclosure statute." s
Press organizations and other advocates of open government
looked to Congress to increase access to federal government docu-
ments. Media lawyer Harold L. Cross, 79 in The People's Right To
Know,80 wrote that "Congress is the primary source for relief ...
The time is ripe for an end to ineffectual sputtering about executive
refusals of access to official records and for Congress to begin exercis-
ing effectually its function to legislate freedom of information for it-
self, the public, and the press."'" Over the next ten years, U.S.
Representative John Moss of California chaired committee hearings in
a push toward opening the federal government's records to the public.
The work of Cross and the Moss Committee culminated in 1966 legis-
lation replacing section 3 of the APA. This legislation is known as the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 2
Although the FOIA does not have a preamble stating its guiding
principle, the Senate Report on the bill states "a general philosophy
of full agency disclosure." 8 Interpreting the FOIA, the Supreme
75. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Steven Helle, The News-Gathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government Expres-
sion, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1, 58-59; Paul A. Ruben, Note, Applying the Freedom of Information
Act's Privacy Exemption to Requests for Lists of Names and Addresses, 58 FoRDHAM L. REv.
1033, 1035 (1990).
79. Cross was general counsel for the New York Herald Tribune. He prepared the original
draft of Maine's Freedom of Access law in 1951. Gordon Scott, Tapping Officials' Secrets in
Maine, in TAPIo OFICIMLS' SEcRETs, supra note 2.
80. See HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT To KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS To PUBLIC RE-
CORDS AND PROCEEDINGS (1953) (tracing the growth of the concept of free information over the
centuries and the response in this country by courts and legislators).
81. Id. at 246.
82. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
83. The term "agency" includes "any executive department, military department, Govern-
ment corporation, Government controlled corporation or other establishment in the executive
branch of the federal government, . . . or any independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C. §
552(c). The Act does not apply to the records of Congress or the federal courts. See 5 U.S.C. §
551(1) for a new definition of agency.
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Court has stated that "[t]he basic purpose of the FOIA is to ensure an
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society,
needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors ac-
countable to the governed." 84
. The FOIA was an effort by Congress to balance society's interest in
open government with other important interests, "such as the public's
interests in the effective and efficient operations of government, ...
and in the preservation of the confidentiality of sensitive personal,
commercial, and governmental information." 8 All records not specif-
ically exempted must be made "promptly available to any person."86
Moreover, the FOIA requires federal agencies to state their reasons
for withholding documents.87 Under the FOIA, nine categories of gov-
ernment records may be exempted from disclosure: (1) those relating
to national security (granting broad discretion to the president to es-
tablish classification criteria); (2) agency rules and practices; (3) statu-
tory exemptions (such as tax returns and census records); (4)
confidential business information (such as financial data and trade se-
crets that might cause competitive harm); (5) interagency or intra-
agency memoranda (working documents historically exempted by the
common law); (6) personnel or-medical files (that "would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"); (7) law enforce-
ment investigations; (8) banking reports; and (9) information (maps)
about oil and gas wells.8
The FOIA does not define "record," 89 nor does it address the me-
dium in which public records are maintained; it does not mention
84. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
85. U.S. DEP'T oF JUsTIcE, GUIDE TO TFIE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 343 (1992). See
also H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1966); S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1965).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). The statute provides:
Except with respect to the records [mandated to be] made available under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A)
reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules
stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the
records promptly available to any person.
Id.
87. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
88. Id. § 552(b)(l)-(9).
89. The Supreme Court, in Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 177 (1980), said an agency
must physically possess documents before they are records (exempting reports prepared and pos-
sessed by private consultants). In Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
445 U.S. 136 (1980), the Court said the FOIA does not require an agency to retrieve records that
have been removed from the agency. In 1991, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill that
would define "records," for purposes of the FOIA, to include electronic information. S. 1940,
102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The bill would also require agencies to provide records in elec-
tronic formats.
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computerized records. However, the Computer Security Act of 198790
prohibits agencies from withholding computerized records from the
public if the records would be available under the FOIA as paper doc-
uments.9 Eight years before the passage of the Computer Security
Act, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in Long v. Internal
Revenue Service.92
The Long court overturned a district court ruling and held that a
computer tape was a public record, subject to disclosure.93 The court
wrote: "In view of the common, widespread use of computers by gov-
ernment agencies for information storage and processing, any inter-
pretation of the FOIA which limits its application to conventional
written documents contradicts the 'general philosophy of full agency
disclosure' which Congress intended to establish. "94
2. State Freedom of Information Laws
Because the FOIA pertains only to federal records, access to records
produced and held by states, counties, or municipalities is established
by state law. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes
providing public access to government records. 9 The comprehensive-
ness of these open records statutes varies significantly. Some states,
such as Louisiana,9 North Dakota," New Hampshire,95 and Florida, 99
have written open records principles into their constitutions. Other
states, such as Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Montana, have had
open records statutes for many yearsim Wisconsin's very first sta-
tutes, enacted in 1849, protected both open meetings and open re-
cords. 01
90. Act of Jan. 8, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724 (1988).
91. Id.
92. 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 365 (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965)).
95. See TAPPING OFFICIALS' SECRETS, supra note 2.
96. LA. CONST. art. Xll, § 3.
97. N.D. CONST. art. X1, § 6.
98. N.H. CONST., pt. 1, art. 8.
99. Florida voters approved a public records constitutional amendment in November 1992.
See FLA. CONsT. art I, § 24. The amendment won 83.1% approval. Nov. 3, 1992, General Elec-
tion Results, Florida Dep't. of State, Div. of Elections (unofficial). See also Kara M. Tollett,
Comment, The Sunshine Amendment of 1992: An Analysis of the Constitutional Guarantee of
Access to Public Records, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 525 (1992).
100. Wisconsin has had an open records law for 153 years; Massachusetts, 133 years; Mon-
tana, 98 years; Florida, 83 years.
101. WIs. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 29, 37, 137 (1849). The original statute requiring constitutional
officers to open their records "has survived virtually unchanged." Robert Christensen, Tapping
Official Secrets in Wisconsin I, in TAPPING OFFcIts' SECRETS, supra note 2.
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Most states depended on the discretion of agencies, or on the com-
mon law, to provide public access to government records until they
were inspired by the federal FOIA to codify the concept of open gov-
ernment. The common law had varied among states, with most courts
requiring a person requesting a record to have a legitimate interest in,
and a useful purpose for, the requested record."°" However, the courts
in some states, such as Michigan, had granted broad common law
rights of access. 103
Most states' open records laws have preambles that identify the
guiding principle: government accountability. Many states tie their
statement of intent to American democratic theory.' 4 Illinois, for ex-
ample, links the right of access with enabling "people to fulfill their
duties of discussing public issues fully and freely" and making "in-
formed political judgments .. .."105 Hawaiian legislators said that
opening government to public scrutiny "is the only viable and reason-
able method of protecting the public's interest."'10 A Delaware statute
declares that "[lit is vital that citizens have easy access to public re-
cords in order that the society remain free and democratic."' ' 7
The open records statutes of most states grant a right or an entitle-
ment to inspect and copy government records to "every person" or to
"any person."'' 0 Some states grant the right of access specifically to
''every citizen. 
'109
Most states apply their open records laws to executive branch agen-
cies, counties, and municipalities. A few states, such as North Dakota
and Kentucky, apply the law broadly to entities that receive public
funding. 10 Many states require some degree of access to records in the
state legislature."' Most states rely on common law principles to
maintain access to the records of the judiciary." 2
102. See Cross, supra note 80, at 26-29.
103. Herschel Fink & Darlene Darnell, Tapping Officials' Secrets in Michigan, TAPPING OF-
FICLAIS' SECRETS, supra note 2 (citing Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 293 (1889) ("I do not think
that any common law ... would deny to the people thereof [the] right of free access to, and
public inspection of, public records.")).
104. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-1 (Burns 1987).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, para. 201 (1987).
106. Haw. HB 2002, § 2 (1975).
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10001 (1991).
108. See TAPPrNO OFIcILs' SECRETS, supra note 2.
109. ALA. CODE § 36.12 (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14.2 (Michie 1992); VA. CODE ANN. §
15.1 (Michie 1992).
110. Some states specify the minimum necessary, such as Kentucky, which sets 25% of the
entity's total budget as the amount of public funds received that subjects a public agency to its
open records law. Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.870 (i) (h) (Baldwin 1992).
111. Including Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Utah, West Virginia. HAW. REv. STAT. § 92F.2
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Computers are only beginning to have an effect on these public re-
cords laws. Illinois" 3 is one of the few states that has recognized the
impact of computers on public records. The state requires public
agencies to furnish lists of records they maintain and a description of
how to obtain computerized records "in a form comprehensible to
persons lacking knowledge of computer language or printout for-
mat.'"
1 4
3. The Right To Know in Florida
Florida has had a tradition of open government since 1909."1 Its
public records law statement of intent says: "It is the policy of this
state that all state, county, and municipal records shall at all times be
open for a personal inspection by any person.""' The Florida public
records law defines public records to include "all documents, papers,
letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or
other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or
received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the trans-
action of official business by any agency.'' "7
All records are available for inspection by the public unless there is
a specific statutory exemption."' Those denied accesg to the records
may institute a civil action, which takes priority over other pending
cases, to compel the agency to allow access. 19 Agencies and officials
that violate the Act are subject to both noncriminal and criminal sanc-
tions, as well as assessment of a prevailing requester's attorneys'
fees. 20
The case law growing out of Florida's public records law' 21 has rein-
forced its broad scope'22 and articulated its underlying philosophy.
(1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.8 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I, § 401 (West 1991);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 25.61 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.010 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132.1
(1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44.04 (1991); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Baldwin 1992); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63.2 (1992); W. VA. CODE § 4.3 (1992).
112. States with statutory mandates of access to judicial records include Nevada, North Car-
olina, Ohio, Utah, and Wyoming. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3.280 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-109 (1992); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1901.31 (Baldwin 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-
2-301 (1992); Wyo. STAT. § 16-4-203 (1992).
113. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 116, para. 205 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
114. Id.
115. See generally ch. 5943, Laws of Florida (1909).
116. FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1991).
117. Id. § 119.011(1).
118. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1979).
119. FLA STAT. § 119.11(1) (1991).
120. Id. § 119.10 (penalties); id. § 119.12 (attorneys' fees).
121. Id. ch. 119 (open records).
122. OFFICE OF THE AT-r'y GEN., GOVERNMENT-IN-THE-SUNsHINE MANUAL, Vol. 15 (1993).
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For example, in 1985 the Second District Court of Appeal in Lorei v.
Smith 2 3 said:
The legislative objective underlying the creation of [the public
records law] was to insure to the people of Florida the right to freely
gain access to governmental records .... The breadth of such [a]
right is virtually unfettered, save for the statutory exemptions
designed to achieve a balance between an informed public and the
ability of government to maintain secrecy in the public interest....
When the demand for disclosure competes with a public interest,
asserted to be protected by statutory exemption, the judiciary's role
is to insure that the governmental claim does not defeat the right to
disclosure. 124
Florida courts have thus been active in protecting the right of ac-
cess. The Fifth District Court of Appeal found in Fritz v. Norflor125
that the law requires compliance by every person who has custody of
public records. ,26 In News Press Publishing Co. v. Gadd,27 the Second
District Court of Appeal held that all documents falling within the
scope of the public records law are subject to disclosure unless specifi-
cally exempted by legislation. 2 That court also found the motivation
of the seeker is irrelevant; the only viable issue is whether the docu-
ments sought are public records. 29
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in 1982 considered Seigle v.
Barry, 130 the first Florida case involving computerized records. In Sei-
gle economists retained by a bargaining unit for employees of the Bro-
ward County School Board sought access to some of the board's
public records maintained on a computer.' 3' The court said that "in-
formation stored on a computer is as much a public record as a writ-
ten page in a book or a tabulation in a file stored in a filing
cabinet."' 3 2 The court also said that "all of the information in the
computer, not merely that which a particular program accesses,
123. 464 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 475 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1985).
124. Id. at 1332.
125. 386 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
126. Id. at 900.
127. 388 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
128. Id. at 278.
129. Id.
130. 422 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1983).
131. Id. at 64. The board had agreed to allow access to the computer records, including the
computer tapes, but refused to use a specially designed program to provide the information in a
printout format the economists preferred. Id. at 65.
132. Id.
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should be available for examination and copying in keeping with the
public policy underlying the right-to-know statutes." 33
Ill. PUBLIC ACCESS TO COMPUTERIZED GOVERNMENT RECORDS:
THE STATE OF THE PRACTICE
A. Computers in Government
One of the chief obstacles to accessing government information in
the computer age has been the low priority placed on public access in
the design of government computer systems. Over the past decade or
more, government computer use has increased dramatically. In just a
few years, some agencies have gone from filing paper records on
seemingly endless rows of shelves in huge storage rooms to keeping
most of those records in computers. It has been a monumental task
simply to ensure that an agency's employees have access to the re-
cords. Employee access has thus often been the priority, frequently
relegating public access to an afterthought.
Governments use computers in large part for convenience and cost
savings. As years have passed and governments have grown, so has
the amount of records governments keep. In many cases it has become
impractical, if not impossible, to continue to handle paper records. It
takes too much space and too many employees to keep track of paper
records. At the same time, the cost of basic computer technology has
plummeted, making computers affordable to even the smallest gov-
ernmental units. 134
1. Federal Agencies
On the federal level, use of computers has grown phenomenally in
the past decade. The number of large computers-known as main-
frames-in use by federal agencies climbed from about 22,000 in 1986
to nearly 48,000 at the beginning of 1990.' 35 Those computers were
worth an estimated $10.5 billion.136 Use of smaller microcomputers,
133. Id. The court ruled that agencies may provide access to computer records through pro-
grams normally used to maintain the public records, but were not obligated to provide records in
the format demanded by the requester. id. at 66. Access by a specially designed program may be
permitted at the discretion of the record holder, and courts may determine when special pro-
grams are necessary for full disclosure. Id. at 66-67.
134. Kenneth L. Kraemer et al., Trends in Municipal Information Systems 1975-1985, 18
BASELINE DATA REPORT, at 2.
135. GENERAL SERVS. ADMIN., FEDERAL INFORMATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, MICROCOM-
PUTER SURVEY REPORT (Sept. 1988).
136. Id.
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often known as personal computers, grew from about 490,000 in 1987
to more than one million in 1989.'"7
2. State and Local Agencies
Growth on the state and local levels has been just as dramatic. Even
the smallest municipal governments may now use computers to store
at least some of their records. 3 ' Ninety-seven percent of the nation's
cities were using computers by 1985, an increase of more than ninety
percent from a decade earlier. 3 9
In Florida, a 1989 survey by the Florida Department of State found
that eighty-three percent of responding agencies said at least twenty-
five percent of their records were computerized. 40 Thirty-four percent
said more than seventy-five percent of their records were computer-
ized. ' 4'
B. Forms of Access
The various computer technologies have clouded the issue of how
best to provide the public access to government records. With paper
records, the issue was clear: Anyone who wanted to examine a record
could sit down with the record and review it at no cost. The record
usually could be photocopied for a nominal fee."42 Electronically held
information, however, can be produced in a variety of formats-a
fact that has complicated the issue.
The electronic equivalent of viewing a paper record is either a com-
puter printout or a public access computer terminal. The information
kept in a computer can be printed, just like a paper record. Public
terminals, on the other hand, allow a user to view the electronic rec-
ord on a video screen-through security measures that will be de-
scribed later-without the ability to alter it. 141
However, computers offer more possibilities for access. The infor-
mation a user requests can be made available on a magnetic tape or
137. GENERAL SERVS. ADMIN., FEDERAL EQUIPMENT DATA CENTER, AUTOMATIC DATA PROC-
ESSING EQUIPMENT IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (Apr. 1990).
138. Jeffrey Brudney, Computers and Smaller Local Government, 12 PuB. PRODUCTrVrrY
REV. 179, 184 (1988).
139. Kraemer, supra note 134, at 2.
140. FLORIDA DEP'T OF STATE, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC RECORDS: EMERGING
IssuEs 42 (1991) [hereinafter EMERGING ISSUEs].
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 119.07(l)(a)(1991).
143. Interview with Richard M. Saig, computer systems officer, Computer Systems Division,
Jacksonville, Fla. (Mar. 5, 1990) [hereinafter Saig Interview]. For a discussion of security meas-
ures, see infra text accompanying note 169.
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computer disk. This can be a great advantage to those seeking a large
volume of records. For instance, a real estate company might be inter-
ested in property tax records for hundreds of homes in a county. The
county could print the information on paper for the real estate com-
pany to enter into its own computer. Or, the county could provide the
information in its electronic format. The real estate company could
then electronically load the information into its computer, saving time
and money. However, there often is a formidable technical challenge
if the two computer systems are not compatible.
At least one survey has shown that government agencies still rely
most heavily on paper formats when providing access. In the Florida
Department of State survey of records custodians in 1989,144 most of
the agencies responding-eighty-three percent-reported they would
provide a computer printout to members of the public who asked to
examine or inspect a computerized record.' 45 Sixty percent of the
agencies reported providing an on-site public access computer. i46
If a member of the public asked for a copy of a computerized rec-
ord, most agencies-eighty-four percent-said they would provide a
computer printout. 147 Thirty-seven percent said they would provide a
computer tape, while nineteen percent would provide a diskette when
asked. 141 Only twenty percent said they offered some type of remote
access via telephone lines to their computers for examining or copying
records. 149
Another issue is an agency's willingness to alter computer programs
to produce requested information. For instance, a journalist might
want to search a courthouse computer database to determine whether
a certain judge has been tough or lenient in sentencing drunk drivers.
But rather than reviewing every drunk driving case, the journalist may
want to sort the cases by the judge's name. So the journalist might ask
the records custodian to modify the database management system or
applications program to allow the search. Some users believe that to
take full advantage of the new electronic information technology,
agencies should provide this type of reprogramming. Some records
custodians, however, have argued that such searches create "new" re-
cords, something not required under most freedom of information
laws. In addition, custodians have said, the cost and the time it takes
to reprogram are prohibitive.1"0
144. See EMERGING ISSUES, supra note 140.
145. Id. at 44.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 45.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 44.
150. Interviews with Lynwood Roberts, tax collector, Jacksonville, Fla.; Lonnie E. Paulk,
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C. Examples of Public Access Systems
Peter Hernon and Charles McClure, in their 1987 critique of federal
information policies, found that agencies used extensive resources to
design and develop electronic information systems."' Although many
agencies paid inadequate attention to preparing indices to the infor-
mation and making other provisions to allow easy public access,'52
there are exceptions at both the federal and state levels.
The first large federal electronic information system designed for
public access was the Security and Exchange Commission's $35 mil-
lion Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval system, or EDGAR.'"
With EDGAR, the SEC collects, processes, and disseminates more
than nine million pages of securities filings each year via computer.5 4
Previously, all of the documents were printed and filed on paper. ED-
GAR benefits the SEC by simplifying the internal processing of pro-
spectuses, registrations, and other filings. But EDGAR also benefits
the users of SEC information by making the documents available by
computer at remote locations.
A private contractor operates the system for the SEC.' 5 Because the
information is public, neither the SEC nor the contractor is allowed to
exert any form of copyright or ownership over the data kept in ED-
GAR. The contractor generates revenue by charging a fee to users
who access EDGAR to examine or retrieve public documents or infor-
mation. 6
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also has established
an innovative public access program. The agency's list of companies
that emit any of more than 350 toxic pollutants is now available
through an electronic database,3 7 the Toxic Release Inventory. It is
accessible to anyone with a microcomputer and a telephone modem
through the National Library of Medicine's Toxicology Data Net-
deputy assistant tax collector, Jacksonville; Kim Stribling, electronic data processing methods
coordinator for the tax collector's office, Jacksonville (Mar. 7, 1990).
151. PETER HERNON & CHARLES MCCLURE, FEDERAL INFORMATION POLICIES IN THE 1980'S:
CONrTLCTS AND ISSUES 168 (1987).
152. Id.
153. Robert M. Gellman, Authorizing EDGAR: Information Policy in Theory and Practice,
5 GOV'T INFO. Q. 201-06 (1988). In 1992, EDGAR began to automatically accept electronic doc-
ument filings-a significant improvement of the system's capabilities. Kurt Eichenwald, The
S.E.C. Goes Electronic as Edgar Starts Running, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1990, at C4.
154. Gellman, supra note 153, at 201.
155. Id. at 203.
156. Id.
157. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CTR., NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, CHEMICAIS, THE PRESS AND
TE PUBLIC (undated).
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work, called TOXNET. There is an hourly fee to access the data-
base." 8
Numerous examples of public access programs can be found at the
state level. For example, Michigan's "Browse" system allows the pub-
lic to monitor the progress of a legislative bill remotely by patching
into a state database through computers in homes or offices. 5 9 In
Minnesota, a nonprofit youth services program can access, via a com-
puter in its office, certain information about its clients held in data-
bases by the state's welfare office.' ° Also, insurance companies have
similar access to driver's license records, and certain, law firms have
limited access to information on criminal cases kept on computer by
law enforcement agencies. 161
In Florida the Secretary of State provides similar dial-up access to
its Division of Corporation's records, which include records for all
active and inactive corporations registered with the state. 62 The state
contracts with a private information company, CompuServe Inc., to
make the records available electronically. CompuServe packages the
records in a form attractive to users and charges a subscription fee to
anyone who wants access. The Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles also provides remote access to selected driver's license
and motor vehicle records through CompuServe. 63 All of these Flor-
ida records may still be reviewed by the public without cost at the
appropriate agency, unless there is specific statutory authority for a
fee. 164
However, such examples are unusual. Far more common are agen-
cies that, for a variety of reasons, frustrate access to government in-
formation held in computers.
D. Obstacles to Access
The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment has identified seven fac-
tors as major impediments to the development of efficient systems of
public access to computerized government records on the state and
158. Id.
159. U.S. OFFICE OF TEcH'Y ASSESSMENT, INNOVATIVE USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FA-
CILITATING PuBLIC ACCESS TO AGENCY DECISIONMAKING: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EXPERIENCE IN
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 14-34 (1985).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. FLORIDA'S INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 5, at 77.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1)(a) (1991).
19931
564 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 20:543
local level. These factors are (1) state laws that do not place a priority
on access; (2) vulnerability of systems to security breaches from either
loss of electronic data as a result of technological problems or unau-
thorized access to the data; (3) threats to the confidentiality of some
information kept on computer; (4) cost of hardware and software
needed to provide access; (5) ability of available software to provide
requested information; (6) lack of citizen awareness and interest; and
(7) varied technology, making it difficult to standardize computer sys-
tems and access programs. 16
These factors have the effect of slowing down, or even halting, ac-
cess programs. In California, for instance, a report on the need for a
public access policy recommended that any. such policy be developed
over the course of several years, rather than months. 166 The report
cited the need to "retrofit large and varied systems and/or employ
developing new technology to resolve the conflicting goals of provid-
ing public access and yet safeguarding confidential information and
the physical data itself. 116 7 The California report identified security
and cost as perhaps two of the most difficult issues to overcome.
The security of electronically held information has been a major
concern at all levels of government. A 1990 report from the State Uni-
versity System of Florida on computer security makes this point:
"The value of state data and software, in terms of restoration costs
and losses due to unauthorized disclosure, far exceeds the value of its
associated hardware. For that reason, information processed by com-
puters must be recognized as a major state asset and be protected ac-
cordingly.'"
Protection of electronic information takes two forms: protection
from loss due to failure of the computer system and protection from
unauthorized access. Protecting electronic records from a computer
failure is akin to protecting paper records from a fire. To accomplish
this, many agencies "back up" electronically stored information onto
computer tapes daily. 69 In effect, this provides a spare copy of the
data.
To protect against unauthorized access, particularly in light of pri-
vacy or national security concerns, agencies frequently employ a series
of codes and passwords. These allow only certain users access to spe-
cific parts of a database, giving some people the ability to read a rec-
165. U.S. OFFICE OF TEcH'y ASSESSMENT, supra note 159, at 31.
166. Id. at 21-23.
167. Id.
168. OFFICE OF RESOURCE MGMNT., STATE UNIV. SYs. OF FLA., STATE OF FLORIDA INFORMA-
TION RESOURCE SECURITY STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES (1990).
169. Saig Interview, supra note 143.
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ord, some the ability to read and retrieve, and some the ability to
read, retrieve, and manipulate. The codes prompt the computer to dis-
play only certain information menus and function options the user is
allowed to access. The most sensitive information will be accessible by
the fewest number of users. If used correctly, user codes and pass-
words can be an effective means of control.
Cost is another potential impediment to access. While computers
save in personnel costs, they still cost governments a great deal of
money. The federal government, as mentioned, has more than $10 bil-
lion of mainframe computers. 17° The cost of computer equipment is
often used in arguments about whether and how much the public
should pay for access to the information stored in them.
During the Reagan Administration, these issues of cost, privacy,
and security were arguments used to curtail access. In 1985 the Office
of Management and Budget released a circular to provide a "general
policy framework for the management of federal information re-
sources.' ' 171 The circular's general thrust was to minimize the federal
government's role in disseminating computerized information. In-
stead, the private sector was encouraged to take raw computer data
from the government and make it accessible to the public for a fee. In
one sense, public access was sacrificed in the process: the cost of sub-
scribing to private information vendors, while it might be reasonable
for businesses, may be beyond the reach of the average citizen.
However, the U.S. House Committee on G6vernment Operations
took the opposite approach. The Committee viewed modern informa-
tion technology as a means to expand the nature and scope of public
access to government information and encouraged federal agencies to
do so. 172 Computers, because of the volume of information they store
and the speed at which they can retrieve it, can allow more efficient
and complete access to governmental information.
To provide effective access for those seeking information about
government, agencies must plan for access, which in general they have
not done. In 1984 the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment found
that computer technology has been used primarily as a means to col-
lect, store, organize, and retrieve public information for internal
use. 73 "Minimal concern is given during the design and implementa-
170. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
171. OFFICE OF MGMNT. AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-130, MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL IN-
FORMATION RESOURCES (1985).
172. Gellman, supra note 153, at 200-01.
173. U.S. OFFICE OF TECH'Y ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROVISION OF PUBLIC IN-
FORMATION: ISSUES RELATED TO PUBLIC ACCESS, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAws/REGULATIONS Xii
(1984).
19931
566 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:543
tion of the federal information systems to enhancing user access to
public information," the report concluded.'7 4
However, the U.S. House Committee on Government Operations in
1986 called on agencies to use modern technology to improve the
range and quality of public access to agency records.'75 "As technol-
ogy permits an agency to upgrade its own ability to access, copy, and
manipulate data, an agency should make reasonable attempts to allow
public users of agency information to share the benefits of automa-
tion," the committee said. 76
IV. LEGAL ISSUES IN COMPUTERIZED AccEss
Any practical discussion of access to government-held records
should begin with a definition of what constitutes a "public record."
This section will look at how "public record" has been defined by the
federal courts under the FOIA, how various states have defined the
term, and in particular how Florida defines to what information citi-
zens have access. This section will then look at how these definitions
have evolved in recent years as paper records yield to the onslaught of
computer technology.
A. The Freedom of Information Act of 1966
In 1966-when the computer was a behemoth of wires and circuits
and still somewhat of a novelty within the federal bureaucracy-Con-
gress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The legislation
affirmed the belief that the business of government should be the peo-
ple's business.177 It opened the records of scores of administrative
agencies to public scrutiny, subject only to nine exemptions. 78 The
requirements of the FOIA did not apply to Congress itself. 79 Interest-
ingly, the term "record" was not specifically defined in the original
FOIA. °80
This oversight was rectified in 1980 by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Forsham v. Harris. ' 8 That case involved a FOIA request for data de-
veloped and held by a private group of physicians and scientists study-
ing diabetic treatment under a grant from the Department of Health,
174. Id.
175. H.R. Rep. No. 560, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1986).
176. Id.
177. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
178. Id. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
179. Id. § 552(a).
180. See generally id. § 552.
181. 445 U.S. 169, 176 (1980).
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Education, and Welfare (HEW). The Court rejected the request, rea-
soning that the information was not in the immediate control of HEW
and therefore was not an "agency record" under the FOIA. 82 Bor-
rowing from the Federal Records Disposal Act,183 the Court defined
public record as "all books, papers, maps, photographs, machine[-
]readable materials or other documentary materials, regardless of
physical form or characteristic, made or received by an agency of the
United States Government under Federal law or in connection with
the transaction of public business."'
In Forsham the Court said records sought under the FOIA must be
in the control of an agency, and that the Act did not require an
agency to acquire records or create new ones. 85 The Court's broad
definition of the form of public records did sweep virtually any kind
of nonexempt information in the control of an agency into the ambit
of the FOIA-including information stored in agency computers. It
did not, however, include physical objects.
The Supreme Court recently established a two-part test to determine
whether government-held information qualified as an "agency rec-
ord" under the FOIA. In Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts the
Court said that a record must have been created or obtained by an
agency and that the record must be under the agency's control at the
time of the FOIA request. 16
The Supreme Court's definition of public records clearly includes
information held in government computers. Courts, however, have
given agencies discretion over how computerized information is made
available to the public and have said that agencies do not have to use
their information technologies to dramatically reconfigure data or cre-
ate new documents to satisfy FOIA requests. The Supreme Court's
definition of "public record" provided expansive wording similar to
various state public records statutes, as the following section demon-
strates.
B. State Definitions of Public Records
Every state has adopted some form of statute addressing the pub-
lic's right of access to government information. 1' Many recent sta-
182. Id. at 177.
183. 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).
184. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 183-85.
186. 492 U.S. 136 (1989).
187. See Burt A. Braverman & Wesley R. Hepler, A Practical Review of State Open Records
Laws, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 720 (1981).
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tutes define public records broadly, similar to the definition offered in
Forsham. Kentucky, for instance, defines public records as "all
books, papers, maps, photographs, cards, tapes, disks, diskettes, re-
cordings or other documentary material regardless of physical form or
characteristic, which are prepared, owned, used, in the possession of
or retained by a public agency. ' ' ' 88
A few states, such as New Mexico and Arizona, provide no binding
definition of what constitutes a public record for purposes of public
inspection. New Mexico allows the "public record" status of informa-
tion to be decided judicially on a case-by-case basis.189 Of the fifty
states and the District of Columbia, most define "public record"
without regard for physical form or characteristic. Such definitions
make computer-held government information at least theoretically ac-
cessible to the public. Some state access statutes explicitly define com-
puter-held information as a public record.' 90
Among the access questions facing states are: Are computerized
public records subject to the same degree of access as records in their
traditional forms? Who decides the form in which computerized re-
cords are made available to the public? Is a computer tape itself a
public record and subject to copying, or can agencies meet their statu-
tory obligations by providing paper copies of information? Are com-
puter programs themselves, as distinct from the information stored in
computers, public records?
In a pair of often-cited cases from the early 1970s, courts held that
computer tapes of paper records were public records. In 1971 the New
Mexico Supreme Court said that a master computer tape of voter reg-
istration affidavits was as much a public record as the affidavits them-
selves.1 91 Likewise, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held in 1973
that a computer tape of field cards used to prepare property tax as-
sessments was itself a public record. 92 The court said that a researcher
was entitled to a copy of the tape, made at his own expense. 193
188. Ky. REV. STAT. § 61.870(2) (Baldwin 1992).
189. See Newsome v. Alarid, 568 P.2d 1236, 1240-41 (N.M. 1977).
190. Statutes in 13 states specifically mention computers: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Utah, and Wisconsin. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (Michie 1992); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 1-19a
(1990); FLA. STAT. § 119.07 (1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, para. 205 (1992); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 88-152 (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.975 (Baldwin 1992); MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV'T §
10-611(f) (1984); MINN. STAT. § 138.17 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1117.04 (1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 132-1 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-9-75 (Law. Co-op. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-
103 (1992); WIS. STAT. § 19.32 (1990).
191. Ortiz v. Jaramillo, 483 P.2d 500 (N.M. 1971).
192. Menge v. City of Manchester, 311 A.2d 116 (N.H. 1973).
193. Id. at 119.
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Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court decided in 1990 that Cook
County was required by the Illinois Freedom of Information Act to
provide a computer tape of employee records to a union, absent a
statutory exemption.1 94 "Under the Illinois Act, having received a
proper request to inspect or copy a public record, the public body
must either comply or state why it cannot comply," the court wrote. 9
Not all state courts regard computer records as necessarily open to
scrutiny of any kind. The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that
computerized records are not necessarily public records. In North Jer-
sey Newspapers Co. v. Passaic County Board of Chosen Freehold-
ers,'9 the court denied a request for telephone records and asserted
that the state legislature did not intend that "all detailed information
a modern computer-based system can generate constitutes [public re-
cords].' 197
States have recently begun to address the issue of whether agency-
developed computer programs-the digital instructions that tell com-
puters how to sort and organize data-are public records.198 A New
Jersey Superior Court held that a computer spread-sheet program de-
veloped by a consultant to the state Department of IJealth to analyze
hospital data was not a public record.'" In a similar vein the Ohio
Supreme Court has said that a computer program developed by a pri-
vate enterprise to process state public records is not a public record. 20
The court reasoned that the agency could provide the records in paper
form and that the software required for use of the record on magnetic
tape was thus not necessary under the state public records statute.20 1
The court said a requester was free to negotiate a price with the pri-
vate contractor to obtain the computer program .202
194. AFSCME v. County of Cook, 555 N.E.2d 361, 365-66 (Il1. 1990).
195. Id. at 366.
196. 601 A.2d 693 (N.J. 1992).
197. Id. at 696.
198. PUBLIC RECORDS Div., OFFICE OF THE MASS. SECRETARY OF STATE, 2 REPORT OF THE
FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ISSUES CONCERNING COMPUTERIZED PUBLIC RECORDS 9 (Boston,
Mass., App., Sept. 1986). Five states specifically exempt computer software from their public
records law: Minnesota, Kansas, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Virginia. MINN. STAT. § 13.03 (5)
(1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45.221 (a) (16) (1991); OKIA. STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.10 (B) (3) (1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 268.357 (1) (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1 - 342 (A) (24) (Michie 1992); Utah
and Florida exempt software when computer programs would compromise agency data or secu-
rity. FLA. STAT. § 119.07 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-103 (1992).
199. Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. New Jersey, 558 A.2d 1363 (1989) (spread-sheet was not
required by law to be kept on file and thus was not a public record).
200. State ex. rel. Recodate Co. v. Buchanan, 546 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1989).
201. Id. at 205.
202. Id.
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In the absence of statutes and case law specifically defining com-
puter records, agencies have frequently turned to their state attorneys
general for guidance. As the following discussion illustrates, agency
queries have asked whether computer-held records were public re-
cords, whether computer tapes were themselves public records,
whether computer tapes were public records when the same informa-
tion existed in another format, and whether computer programs were
public records.
The advent of computer technology has sometimes rendered state
and local agencies' understanding of public record laws obsolete. The
laws, written when most records were paper, often prove ambiguous
when agency personnel are confronted with requests for information
in nontraditional forms. For example, in 1978 the Maryland Attorney
General's Office was asked whether the state Public Information Law
was intended to apply to information on computer tapes. The opinion
said there was "no rational basis to distinguish a computer tape from
a sound recording, film, paper or other type of document containing
information. '203 In 1979 the South Carolina Attorney General's Of-
fice issued an opinion advising an agency that the mere fact that re-
cords were held in a computer did not affect their status as public
records.20
4
The Connecticut Attorney General's Office advised that informa-
tion compiled by computer from documents received by a state agency
during the conduct of state business was itself a public record.2 0,5 In
1980 the Tennessee Attorney General's Office said that records stored
in computers, but not printed out, were public records if they other-
wise would be.2 06 That same year, the Tennessee Attorney General dis-
tinguished between computer records that reflected the final form of a
public record and preliminary drafts that assisted in the creation of
such a document. 207 The Florida Attorney General reached a similar
conclusion.208
Another issue raised by computerization is the question of the
status of computer programs developed by state and local agencies. A
203. 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 659 (1978).
204. 79 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 134 (1979). See also Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 18 (July 23,
1981) (public records include records on computer magnetic tape, disk-readable records, and
other machine-readable media); Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 401 (1983), No. 352 (1982) (informa-
tion does not fall outside state records act merely because it is stored on magnetic tapes or disks);
Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 128 (1983) (information that is a public record in its original form
remains so when maintained in computer files).
205. 83 Op. Conn. Att'y Gen. 87 (1983).
206. 80 Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. 125 (1980).
207. Id. at 288.
208. 1985 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 87.
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1970 Wisconsin Attorney General opinion said an agency could sell a
computer program as surplus, so long as the program was not devel-
oped for resale purposes.209 Two county-developed computer pro-
grams used by a county appraiser's office were public records,
according to a 1987 Oregon Attorney General opinion. 210
C. Computerized Records in Florida
Florida's public records law provides an expansive definition of
"public records." It defines public records as "all documents, papers,
letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or
other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or
received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the trans-
action of official business by any agency." ' 21 The Florida Supreme
Court further expanded this definition interpreting public records to
include "any material prepared in connection with official agency
business which is intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize
knowledge of some type. '2 12
While the statute's definition of public record refers to government
information "regardless of physical form or characteristic," it makes
no specific mention of computerized information.21 1 In 1982, how-
ever, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled in Seigle v.
Barry that all data held in state computers-not just that which is ac-
cessible by a particular program-are public records. 21 4
The Florida Attorney General followed Seigle when the Florida
Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission asked about public access to
computer tapes of names and addresses of subscribers to a Commis-
sion publication. The Attorney General advised that, absent a statute
exempting such records, the computer tapes were public records
within the meaning of the public records law. 215
The state's definition of public records does not encompass rough
drafts or notes to be used in preparing some other documentary mate-
rial. 216 Computer counterparts to such rough drafts and notes are not
209. 59 Op. Wise. Att'y Gen. 145 (1970).
210. 21 Op. Or. Att'y Gen. 26 (1987).
211. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (1991).
212. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla.
1980).
213. Section 119.07(1)(b), however, does mention computers with respect to fees for the "ex-
tensive" use of information technology resources. See also FLA. STAT. § 119.085 (1991).
214. Seigle v. Barry, 422 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 988
(Fla. 1983).
215. 1985 FLA. Arr'VY GEN. ANN. REP. 3.
216. Id. at 87.
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public records, the Attorney General's office said in response to a
query from the Florida Secretary of State.217 The Secretary asked
whether machine-readable intermediate files-computer files often
created for only seconds during the document-construction process-
were public records that must be maintained. The opinion concluded
that the files were not public records because they "are not intended
to perpetuate or formalize knowledge of some type but rather consti-
tute mere precursors of government records." 2 8
Another issue with computer-record implications involves whether a
county must provide access to copies of government records stored
outside a county when original documents are available at the county
courthouse. The Santa Rosa County Attorney asked the Attorney
General whether the county had to transport microfilmed records
stored outside the county back to the courthouse to comply with a
public records request. The Attorney General, citing Seigle,2 9 noted
that the requester could not determine the format in which the records
are disclosed. The opinion said, however, that by storing and main-
taining the records at a private storage facility, the county had desig-
nated the storage company as the custodian of the copies of the public
records, and as such the company was subject to the copying and in-
spection provisions of Florida's public records law. 220 The implication,
when copies of government computer records are stored by a third
party in a centralized location, is that such records are equally accessi-
ble under the state's public records law.
Another significant access issue is whether a computer program it-
self-the software that collects, stores, retrieves, and processes infor-
mation-is a public record. In 1990 the Florida Legislature amended
the public records law to allow agencies to copyright and sell copies of
agency-developed data processing software at market prices.'22 How-
ever, the amendment requires agencies to make available software
"solely for application to data or information maintained or gener-
ated by the agency that created the [software]" under the public re-
cords law fee structure. 222 Presumably, copyrighted agency software
should not, under the amendment, inhibit access.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Seigle v. Barry, 422 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 988 (Fla.
1983).
220. 1988 FLA. Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 26.
221. FLA. STAT. § 119.083 (1991). Bills pending in the Legislature as this Article went to press
would repeal this statute and include agency-created software within the definition of "public
record" in § 119.01. Fla. SB 562 (1993); Fla. HB 1683 (1993). Both bills had been approved by
committees as this Article went to press and were pending before the Senate and the House.
222. FLA. STAT. § 119.083(3) (1991).
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The Attorney General has also broadly interpreted access laws to
prevent computerized communication among government officials
from limiting access. In 1989 the Attorney General advised that com-
puter messages among public officials who conduct public business
are the same as public meetings and create public records subject to
the open records law. 2 3 In one opinion, the Attorney General advised
the Hillsborough County Attorney that if county commissioners
linked their offices on a computer network, they could not use the
technology to conduct meetings. 2 4 The use of the computers by com-
missioners to communicate among themselves on issues pending be-
fore the body appears to be subject to the open meetings law, the
opinion said. It added that any related information transmitted by or
held in the county commission's computer system was a public rec-
ord 225
A second opinion involved the Palm Beach County School Board's
decision to put computer terminals, linked to the school board's of-
fices, in board members' homes. 26 The Attorney General's office ad-
vised that correspondence among public officials about public
business was a public record. An assistant state attorney commented,
'.[t]he definition of a public record is intended to include just about
anything-not just paper documents." '227
In summary, computerized government information in Florida is
clearly a public record. The Attorney General's office has said that
computer tapes themselves are public records and has suggested that
computerized copies of public records, even if held by third parties,
are as public as the original records.
D. Novel Questions About Computer Access
While the courts leave little doubt that information in government
computers constitutes a public record, a number of conflicts have
arisen over public access to such records. As the court in Yeager v.
DEA suggested, these cases present novel and important questions
concerning the interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act as it
223. 1989 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 39.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Computer Messages Are Public Records, BRECHNER REP. (Brechner Ctr. for Freedom
of Info., Univ. of Fla.), Mar. 1989, at 3.
227. Id. For an intriguing twist on this issue at the federal level, see Armstrong v. Executive
Office of the President, No. 89-142, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 6, 1993), where
the court held electronic messages of the outgoing Bush administration could not be fully repro-
duced on paper and, thus, were records themselves which could not be erased under the Federal
Records Act.
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applies to agency records stored in computers. 28 The questions being
raised include:
-Does the retrieval of data from an agency computer constitute
creation of a new record, which the FOIA does not require?
-Do agencies have to create programs to satisfy requests for data
not already processed for agency use?
-To what extent must an agency segregate exempt and non-exempt
data in a computer to fulfill an FOIA request?
-To what extent must agencies invest in new computer technolo-
gies to enhance public access?
-Should the agency or the requester determine the physical form in
which a public record will be made available?
1. Duty To Create a New Record
It is well-established that agencies do not have to create records to
meet FOIA requests. 229 In the case of paper records, agencies are not
required to gather information from various sources to create new
documents or to analyze or summarize information in their files.
However, what constitutes "creation" of a record when the capabili-
ties of the computers are considered is less clear.
In Yeager, for example, a requester sought information that, as it
existed in the agency's computer for agency use, was shielded from
disclosure under an FOIA exemption. 230 The requester argued that the
FOIA imposed a duty on the agency to use computers to edit the data
in such a way to make it disclosable.2 1' The court rejected this reason-
ing and concluded that agencies were not required to create a new rec-
ord by restructuring data in order to satisfy an FOIA request. 232
In Long v. IRS the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reached a different conclusion in a similar situation. 233 The Internal
Revenue Service argued that providing a computer tape with some in-
formation deleted constituted creation of a new record, which the
FOIA did not require. The court rejected the IRS's argument. The
court said that using agency computers to delete identifying informa-
tion to protect personal privacy was permissible and that the resulting
"record" was not a new record for FOIA purposes.23 4
228. 678 F.2d 315, 317, 326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
229. See generally Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136,
153 (1980); NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 162 (1975).
230. 678 F.2d at 318.
231. Id. at 318-19.
232. Id. at 327.
233. 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979).
234. Id. at 365-66.
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Many state courts, mirroring the federal courts, do not require
agencies to create new records to satisfy requests for copies of public
records. Several state courts, however, have said that removing identi-
fying information or scrambling data to protect identities does not
constitute creation of new records. A New York court, for example,
held in 1980 that a school district must release test scores after using
its computer to delete names and to scramble the order of the names
to ensure anonymity. 23 The resulting information was not a new rec-
ord for access purposes, the court said. The Illinois Supreme Court
used similar reasoning in 1989 when it held that a school district was
not creating a new record by providing computer compilations of
achievement test scores with names removed and the order of the
scores scrambled. 236
In Florida, the Fourth District Court of Appeal declared in Seigle v.
Barry that the state's public records law does not obligate a custodian
to produce a new record by manipulating data contained in existing
records. 2 7 The court stated that "[i]f the health department maintains
a chronological list of dog-bite incidents with rabies implications [a]
plaintiff, bitten by a suspect dog, may not require the health depart-
ment to reorder that list and furnish a record of incidents segregated
by geographical areas." 238
2. Creation of Computer Programs To Meet FOIA Requests
An issue related to the question of whether generating a document
from a computer is "creating" a record is whether agencies must de-
velop computer programs in order to compile or organize information
to meet FOIA requests. A federal district court in Pennsylvania said
that creation of a special computer program to satisfy a public records
request exceeded the U.S. Department of Treasury's obligations to
provide records under the FOIA.1 9 Clarke v. U.S. Department of
Treasury2° arose when an individual asked the Treasury Department
for names and addresses of all registered institutional owners of cer-
tain bonds, along with the dollar amount, maturity date, and owner-
ship of each bond.21 The Treasury Department refused the request on
the grounds the information as requested did not already exist as an
agency record.
235. Kryston v. Board of Educ., 430 N.Y.S.2d 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
236. Bowie v. Evanston Community Consol. Sch. Dist., 538 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1989).
237. 422 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1983).
238. Id. at 65.
239. Clarke v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, No. 84 Civ. 1873 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1986).
240. Id.
241. Id.
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The requester argued that the information was neither privileged
nor confidential and that a computer program could be written to ex-
tract the pertinent information. However, the court said that "[w]hile
an agency may be required to produce records that do exist, it is not
required to make them. '2 42 The court also noted that the Treasury
Department's own regulations provide that "[t]here is no requirement
that records be created or data processed in a format other than re-
quired for government purposes" in order to comply with a request.243
The issue of computer programming was alluded to in a 1989 case
in which a federal district court in California said the Immigration
and Naturalization Service had a duty to use its computer to search
for records in response to FOIA requests. 2" In Mayock v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service the court said requests for "all re-
cords" under the FOIA should generally be interpreted by the INS to
include computer searches of relevant electronic databases.2 4 The
Mayock court, however, did not define "search" or suggest to what
extent an agency should program its computers beyond programming
already used by the agency.
3. Segregation of Computerized Data
Another situation that has posed difficulties for computerized ac-
cess arises when information disclosable under the FOIA is combined
with exempt information in government files. In such instances, the
FOIA requires agencies to provide "[a] reasonably segregable portion
of a record ... after deletion of the portions which are ex-
empt .... 2"4 The notion of what steps agencies should reasonably
take to provide access was developed when deleting exempt material
consisted of manually blacking out the information on each docu-
ment.
Based on several cases involving written documents, federal courts
have established four criteria to determine whether nonexempt mate-
242. Id. (citing Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152
(1980).)
243. Id. (citing 31 C.F.R. § 1.5(a) (1984)). See American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Depart-
ment of Defense, No. 83-4916, slip. op. at 13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1988), cited in FOIA UPDATE,
Spring/Summer 1990, at 20. The same federal court that decided Clarke later broached the ques-
tion of whether an agency should develop a "new computer software program" to process
agency data. The court, however, never answered this question. See also Gurrier v. Hernandez,
566 N.Y.S.2d 406, 407 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (agency not required to create statistical informa-
tion from database, despite requester's claim such creation would be a "very simple matter");
State ex rel. Scanlon v. Deters, 544 N.E.2d 680 (Ohio 1989) (agency not required to produce
compilation of data that does not presently exist or which computer is not programmed to pro-
duce).
244. Mayock v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 714 F. Supp. 1558 (N.D. Cal. 1989),
rev'd on other grounds, 938 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1991).
245. Id.
246. 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (1988).
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
rial is reasonably segregable from exempt material. First, agencies
need not segregate-and thus may deny access-when the process re-
sults in an unintelligible document. 47 Second, agencies can refuse to
segregate when disclosable material is so inextricably intertwined with
nondisclosable information that segregation is not feasible and would
place an inordinate burden on the agency.2 48 Third, disclosure would
not be required when disclosable material is largely interspersed with
nondisclosable information,249 once again resulting in a document that
does not meaningfully represent the record as a whole. The fourth and
final instance occurs when disclosure of nonexempt information
would be revealing and endanger the confidentiality of the exempt in-
formation within the record.2 10
When records are stored in computers, the issue of segregability be-
comes more complex. In some cases, deletion of exempt information
can be accomplished with the push of a button. Ease of segregation,
however, is dependent on how the agency computer system has been
designed. It may be easier to formulate a query to segregate nonex-
empt information on newer databases, such as relational databases,
than it is with some older hierarchical mainframe databases. 2 1 None-
theless, agencies have been reluctant to recognize that computers can
make it easier for them to segregate data, balking at the idea of delet-
ing exempt material to facilitate disclosure.
Two circuits of the U.S. Court of Appeals have attempted to deal
with the question of segregability of information held in government
computers, with different results. 22 In 1979 the Ninth Circuit said that
"editing" identifying information on individual taxpayers to satisfy
an FOIA request was within the scope of the agency's duty to reason-
ably segregate exempt and non-exempt data to satisfy an FOIA re-
quest. 23 In Long v. IRS the court said it did not believe the "mere
deletion of names, addresses, and social security numbers results in
the agency's creating a whole new record. 2154 The court, however, was
247. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 86 (2d Cir. 1979).
248. See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
249. See Lead Industry, 610 F.2d at 70; see also Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Harris, 488 F. Supp.
1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
250. See Lead Industry, 610 F.2d at 70; see also Briton v. Department of State, 476 F. Supp.
535, 541-42 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981).
251. See generally Steven Guengerich & Sandra Rotenberg, Strategic Thinking in Picking a
DBMS, NETWORK WORLD, Oct. 14, 1991, at 55.
252. Yeager v. DEA, 678 F.2d 315 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir.
1979).
253. Long, 596 F.2d 362.
254. Id. at 366.
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not clear about whether an agency should create a new computer pro-
gram to achieve such redaction.
Two years later, in Yeager v. DEA, the D.C. Circuit reached a dif-
ferent conclusion when it considered "the extent to which an agency is
required to employ its computer capabilities in fulfilling its duty to
segregate and release nonexempt material." ' The case began with a
request for several entire DEA computer files on narcotics viola-
tions-data normally shielded by a FOIA exemption. The requester
asked that the DEA "collapse" the records. Collapsing, a relatively
complex process, involves using a computer to eliminate identifying
information, leaving only nonsensitive, disclosable aggregate data.
Collapsing data, for example, might involve taking specific informa-
tion, such as a date, and expressing it in more general terms, such as a
ten-year span. 2"6 The court refused to require the agency to collapse
the data, maintaining the FOIA "does not contemplate imposing a
greater segregation duty upon agencies that choose to store records in
computers than upon agencies that employ manual retrieval sys-
tems. ' 2 7 In other words, the court said that even though an agency's
computers can perform tasks to make data lawfully disclosable, the
agency's only duty is to perform tasks analogous to segregating infor-
mation in paper format.
The Yeager court concluded that "the FOIA does not mandate that
the DEA use its computer capabilities to 'compact' or 'collapse' infor-
mation as part of its duty to disclose reasonably segregable informa-
tion.''"5 However, the court did suggest that computers provide
agencies with more flexibility to meet FOIA requests, and that agen-
cies should be encouraged to perform services they are not required to
provide. 259
4. Use of New Technology
While the Yeager court encouraged agencies to use their computer
capabilities to voluntarily go beyond the letter of the law to satisfy
FOIA requests,26 the extent to which federal agencies have an obliga-
tion to invest in costly new technologies in order to enhance public
access remains limited. In 1986 a federal court in Florida held that the
United States Customs Service was not obligated to invest in costly
255. 678 F.2d at 320.
256. Id. at319n.9.
257. Id. at 322.
258. Id. at 327.
259. Id. at 326-27.
260. Id.
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technology to provide computer terminals for public access.,61 In Mar-
tin & Merrell, Inc. v. United States Customs Service a customs broker
seeking certain liquidation entries on file with the Customs Service ar-
gued that the Service's Miami division should install on-site computer
terminals so that persons seeking information about liquidation dates
could access the data without the inconvenience of having to file
FOIA requests. 262 In rejecting the broker's argument, the court stated:
"The [FOIA] in no way contemplates that agencies ... should invest
in the most sophisticated and expensive form of technology." 263
5. Form of Record Disclosure
Although the FOIA itself never defined exactly what comprised a
"record" within the scope of the FOIA, it is reasonable to conclude
that the Act envisioned record requests being met by supplying paper
documents. But as the computer became the rule rather than the ex-
ception in government record-keeping, it became less obvious what
constituted an adequate response to a record request when records are
potentially available in non-paper form. Records can take the form
not only of paper documents, but also of magnetic computer tapes,
floppy disks, and other computer-readable formats. With records
available in multiple forms, requesters might find one more useful
than another. For example, a computer tape of a database that can be
electronically analyzed is often much more useful than a bulky com-
puter printout of the same material.
With multiple options available for providing public access, a ques-
tion arises: Who should determine the form in which a public record
is released-the agency holding the record or the party seeking it? In
an influential decision, a federal district court concluded that the
agency should ultimately decide the form in which a record is pro-
vided.2 64
In Dismukes v. Department of the Interior a District of Columbia
district court held in 1984 that an agency could make information
available in a form the agency deemed most useful to the typical re-
quester. 265 The requesting party in this case sought the names and ad-
dresses of participants in an Interior Department oil and natural gas
leasing lottery, and wanted the records on computer tapes. The Inte-
261. Martin & Merrell, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 657 F. Supp. 733, 734 (S.D. Fla.
1986).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Dismukes v. Department of the Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760, 761-63 (D.D.C. 1984).
265. Id.
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rior Department stored the information on both computer tapes and
microfiche files but chose to make it available only in the latter form.
The Department argued that it routinely made such information avail-
able on microfiche because that was the form requesters generally pre-
ferred. The court backed the agency, but cautioned that the form in
which the agency chose to provide a record could neither "unreasona-
bly hamper" the requester nor reduce the usefulness of the informa-
tion.3 The court followed Dismukes in 1988 when it decided National
Security Archives v. CIA. 67 In that case, the court stated that the
Central Intelligence Agency did not have to provide records in elec-
tronic database format after it had already provided a computer prin-
tout of the records in response to an FOIA request.2 6 Again, in
Coalition for Alternatives in Nutrition & Health Care, Inc. v. FDA,
the same court followed Dismukes by deciding that the agency could
determine the form in which records are made available under the
FOIA 269
While federal courts have held that an agency may determine the
form in which a record will be released under the FOIA, some state
courts have shown more flexibility. 270 For example, in 1973 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that a computer tape of field cards
used to prepare property tax assessments was itself a public record. 271
Reasoning that the computer tape was as much a public record as the
paper documents, the court held that a researcher seeking the assess-
ment data was entitled to a copy of the tape made at his own ex-
pense.272 In another state decision, a New York court concluded that
266. Id. at 762; cf. Timken Co. v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 239, 242 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987) (holding that computer printouts of requested files were unresponsive to an FOIA request
because the printed files were not as useful to the requester as the information on computer
tape).
267. National Sec. Archives v. CIA, Civ. No. 88-119 (D.D.C. July 26, 1988).
268. Id.
269. Coalition for Alternatives in Nutrition & Health Care, Inc. v. FDA, No. 90 Civ. 1025
(D.D.C. Jan. 4,1991). See also Hahn v. IRS, No. 90 Civ. 2782 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 1992) (holding
IRS need not provide records in form "comprehensible to a layperson"). Cf. Army Times Pub-
lishing Co. v. Department of the Army, 684 F. Supp. 720 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding Army required
to provide computer tapes; however, issue was not format but existence of FOIA exemption).
270. For an example of a state court following the federal courts' holdings that agencies may
determine the form of a response, see Seigle v. Barry, 422 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev.
denied, 431 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1983).
271. Menge v. City of Manchester, 311 A.2d 116, 119 (N.H. 1973); see also Blaylock v.
Staley, 732 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Ark. 1987) (suggesting, in dicta, that requester could obtain mag-
netic tape rather than paper copy if no undue burden on agency); but see Tax Data Corp. v.
Hutt, 826 P. 2d 353 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that paper printout constitutes reasonable
access; no requirement that the agency allow requester "hands-on" use of computer terminal);
Chapin v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 577 A.2d 300, 301 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (holding state
law allows agency to provide only paper copy of requested information; need not provide com-
puter disk).
272. Menge, 311 A.2d at 119.
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the intent of a state public records law to provide maximum access
could not be frustrated by the format in which information is pro-
vided.273 The court held that a New York City agency must provide
computer tapes of its records to a commercial publisher rather than
printouts of the information. 274 The court reasoned that requiring the
requester to search manually through more than a million pages of
printouts undermined the principle of maximum access.2 75 The court
also noted that the cost of providing computer tapes was less than
providing printouts. 27 6
VI. COMPUTERS AND THE PRIVACY EQUATION
A. Privacy in Peril
The tension between personal privacy and government's need to
gather and analyze personal information is long-standing. Govern-
ments have an interest in keeping complete, accurate information on
individuals. This information allows them to spend tax revenues pru-
dently and to check for fraud and waste by program beneficiaries. For
example, finding welfare recipients who receive more than their share
of benefits saves tax dollars and prevents cheaters from living well at
the expense of the needy and the taxpayers.
The public, and particularly the media, have always had an interest
in having access to records of government. Access to such records al-
lows citizens to monitor their government and discourages clandestine
abuses. The retention of massive files on such people as the Reverend
Martin Luther King, Jr. is an example of the undesirable activity pos-
sible when government records are outside the public's reach.2 77
While the public has a right to know about the activities of govern-
ment, individuals on whom the government keeps records also have
an interest in preventing disclosure of embarrassing or sensitive infor-
mation. Release of such information might harm reputations, cost
jobs, or result in other forms of discrimination or sanctions. For ex-
ample, disclosure that an individual is HIV positive, or actually has
AIDS, might have such results.
Before computers dominated government record-keeping, the best
protections for personal privacy were practical barriers. The expense
273. Brownstone Publishers, Inc. v. New York City Dep't of Bldgs., 560 N.Y.S.2d 642
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
274. Id. at 643.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. DAVID GARRow, Ti FBI AND MARarN LUTHER KING, JR. (1981).
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in gathering large numbers of paper records was often costly and
time-consuming, and analysis of such material was tedious. Comput-
ers, however, have compressed the gathering and sorting functions
and have made records, once tucked obscurely in file cabinets at dis-
tant locations, available with relative ease. 27 The U.S. Supreme Court
has noted that such efficiency robs individuals of their "practical ob-
scurity" and prevents them from putting past mistakes behind them
and moving on to productive lives.2 79
The sheer volume of computer data available has eroded personal
privacy by making more information about individuals available. Po-
tentially damaging information, now stored more widely and kept
longer, is available for use and misuse as never before. This informa-
tion explosion is due partly to the drastic reduction of space needed
for record-keeping. Computer storage media such as magnetic tapes
and floppy disks can store what once took rows of file cabinets. This
abundance of storage space has freed agencies to gather more and
more information and to keep it longer. The ease of storing informa-
tion at a lower cost has made it easier to keep records than to dispose
of them. David F. Linowes, author of Privacy in America2 10 com-
pares surplus information to atomic waste because scientists "have
not yet given us the practical means for safely disposing of either.",'
As a result of the ease with which it can be stored, personal informa-
tion is now often kept long after it has become outdated and inaccu-
rate; as individuals go through life and their circumstances change,
information often becomes obsolete or irrelevant. 282
While the volume of personal information has increased dramati-
cally, computers have made obtaining access to specific information
much easier. Government agencies have developed computer pro-
grams that allow them to retrieve information quickly28 3 without hav-
ing to sift through indices or records. Frequently, information can be
obtained with a few simple keystrokes at a computer terminal.
As faster computers are developed, searching files will only get eas-
ier. Computer searches that are now time-consuming and costly will
become virtually instantaneous. Practical access will become easier
and the threat to privacy potentially greater.
278. See generally DAVID F. LINOWES, PRIVACY IN AMERICA: Is YOUR PRIVATE LIFE IN THE
PUBLIC EYE? (1989).
279. Justice Dep't v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989).
280. LiNowEs, supra note 278.
281. Id. at 14.
282. id. at 12 (giving examples of problems created by obsolete or inaccurate data).
283. See generally FLORIDA'S INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 5, at 83-96.
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Because of the ease of computer access and data sharing among nu-
merous agencies, the de facto protection of "practical obscurity" has
disappeared.2  Individuals can no longer rely on the scattered, hard-
to-find nature of information about themselves to create an expecta-
tion of privacy. Concerns about the erosion of privacy have led many
commentators to raise the specter of George Orwell's "Big Brother"
as more and more personal information finds its way into government
computers. 2S5 Legislatures have responded to this concern with sta-
tutes designed to ensure personal privacy.
B. Federal Privacy Laws
1. The Privacy Act
The Privacy Act of 197426 was passed to regulate how government
used personal information and was inspired by fears of "the impact
of computer data banks on individual privacy''287 that grew out of the
debate over a proposal for a National Data Center to pool govern-
ment information. The Privacy Act forbids disclosure of information
without an individual's consent281 and grants the individual access to
all collected information. 289
The Act also allows individuals to request that records about them
be corrected if they contain inaccuracies. 90 If an agency denies a cor-
rection request, the individual can bring a civil action against the
agency.29' Courts then may order an agency to amend the individual's
record.292 The Privacy Act, however, contains several agency exemp-
tions, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secret Service,
and law enforcement agencies. 29
Another exemption applies to information disclosed for "routine
use" by a collecting agency.2 94 Agencies have often cited this exception
284. See Justice Dep't v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989).
285. See John Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer
Matching, and Privacy in the United States, 35 HAsTios L.J. 991 (1984); Toby Solomon, Per-
sonal Privacy and the 1984 Syndrome, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 753 (1985).
286. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
287. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974).
288. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
289. Id. § 552a(d).
290. Id. § 552a(d)(2).
291. Id. § 552a(d)(3).
292. Id. § 552a(g)(2)(a).
293. Id. § 552ao)(1), (j)(2), (k)(3).
294. Id. § 552a(b)(3).
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to avoid the individual consent requirement by defining routine use
expansively. 25 An agency might, for example, define routine use as
release to academic researchers. One information technology expert
said of the exemption: "You could drive a truck through it." 296
Another problem with the Privacy Act is that it was enacted when
government records were maintained primarily on paper. 97 New com-
puter technologies allow agencies to store and manipulate data in
ways not covered by the Act, effectively limiting the Act's protec-
tion. 298 Thus, the Privacy Act's attempt to protect informational pri-
vacy as "a personal and fundamental right protected by the
Constitution ' 299 has to some extent been undermined.
2. The Freedom of Information Act
Although the FOIA3ID establishes a "general philosophy of full
agency disclosure" 0' to government records, the Act contains an ex-
emption designed to protect individuals from unnecessary disclosure
of personal information in government files.302 That exemption allows
agencies to withhold information in personnel, medical, and similar
files when disclosure would constitute "a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy." 303
Because computer record compilations may contain summaries of
widely scattered, hard-to-retrieve data, they may be exempt from dis-
closure under the exception. For example, in Justice Department v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,3°4 an exemption for
law enforcement records was held to apply to computerized summa-
ries of arrest records.
C. The Supreme Court and Informational Privacy
Although a right of privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the United
States Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a limited
295. Interview with Edwin Levine, Staff Director, Fla. JR. Legis. Info. Tech'y Resource
Comm. (Mar. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Levine Interview]; see also Todd Coles, Does the Privacy Act
of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 Am.
U. L. REv. 957, 959 (1991).
296. Levine Interview, supra note 295.
297. See FLORIDA'S INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 5, at 123.
298. Id. at 124.
299. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1897. See also H.R. REP.
No. 1416, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1974).
300. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
301. S. RaP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
302. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
303. Id.
304. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
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right to private decision making. For example, the Court has held
there is a constitutional right to privacy in the use of contraceptives05
and in the decision to have an abortion. 30
Those cases recognized a right to decisional privacy. Decisional pri-
vacy is the individual interest in making deeply personal decisions free
from governmental interference.3'" Computer privacy cases, on the
other hand, involve informational privacy. Informational privacy is
the individual's interest in controlling the flow of information about
him- or herself.308 Because decisional privacy and informational pri-
vacy are distinct interests, decisional privacy cases do not necessarily
provide guidance for informational privacy issues.
One of the first major opinions addressing informational privacy
was the 1967 case of Katz v. United States.3°9 In Katz the Court held
that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their telephone
conversations. The Court found that the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures extended to intangible
items such as Katz's phone conversation. 10 Katz demonstrated the
Court's willingness to extend zones of privacy beyond the "persons,
houses, papers and effects" explicitly mentioned in the Fourth
Amendment."' However, the Court limited its holding to the conver-
sation at issue and did not declare a generalized right to informational
privacy. 1 2
The Supreme Court did not address informational privacy again un-
til 1976 in Paul v. Davis."' In Paul the Court refused to expand the
right to privacy to prohibit a state from publicizing an arrest.314 The
plaintiff in that case had been included in a flyer listing "active shop-
lifters" that was distributed to local merchants by police.3", Writing
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist found no informational privacy
right in the Constitution. 16 Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the
Court's "right of privacy" cases had dealt with substantive restric-
tions on such activities as procreation and contraception. 17 "None of
305. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
306. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
307. See id. at 154-55.
308. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.25 (1977).
309. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
310. Id. at 353.
311. U.S. CONSS. amend. IV.
312. Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-50.
313. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 694-95.
316. Id. at 713-14.
317. Id. at 713.
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our substantive privacy decisions hold this or anything like this, and
we decline to enlarge them in this manner," Rehnquist wrote., 8
In United States v. Miller,31 9 decided shortly after Paul, the Court
again declined to declare a right of informational privacy. In Miller
the issue was whether a subpoena of an individual's bank records vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment by intruding into a constitutionally pro-
tected zone of privacy.320 Bank records, the Supreme Court held, did
not carry a legitimate expectation of privacy. Justice Powell reasoned
that since the records "contain only information voluntarily conveyed
to the banks and exposed to their employees" 32' in the ordinary course
of business, the owner forfeited any constitutional expectation of pri-
vacy in their contents . 2
The Court did discuss an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters" in the 1977 case of Whalen v. Roe. 323 In Whalen
physicians and patients challenged a state statute creating a database
of information on prescriptions issued for certain drugs. 2 4 The Court
upheld the statute, but alluded to a privacy interest in preventing dis-
closure of personal matters. 32 However, the Court did not say when
that interest might allow an individual to refuse to disclose informa-
tion or to block access to records. 32 6 The assertion of a privacy interest
stands alone in the opinion, and the Court did not clarify the nature
of the privacy interest.
In another 1977 case, Nixon v. Administrator of General Serv-
ices,3 27 the Supreme Court alluded again to the existence of an infor-
mational privacy interest. In that case the Court was confronted with
a constitutional privacy challenge to a statute allowing the Adminis-
trator of General Services to take control of the papers of former
President Richard Nixon . 2 The Nixon Court acknowledged the exis-
tence of "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters .... "329 The Court, after considering Nixon's privacy inter-
318. Id.
319. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 442.
322. Id.
323. 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
324. Id. at 593.
325. Id.
326. See generally Glenn C. Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It Constitutional To Give
It Out?): Caller Identification Technology and the Right to Informational Privacy, 37 UCLA L.
REv. 145, 172-75 (1989); Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Infor-
mational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REv. 133 (1991).
327. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 457.
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est, concluded the statute was constitutional. 30 The Nixon Court de-
clined to define the constitutional privacy interest. Moreover, as in
Whalen, that interest was not part of the Court's holding.
In summary, the Court declined in Paul and Miller to recognize a
right to informational privacy. Later, in Whalen and Nixon, while
recognizing an informational privacy "interest," the Court did not
define the extent of the protected interest. Taken together, these cases
suggest there is as yet no firm constitutional right to informational
privacy.
D. Access and Privacy Cases
The Supreme Court has been more expansive in recognizing privacy
interests in access cases where the privacy interests are derived from
statutory language. In Department of the Air Force v. Rose, for ex-
ample, the Court held that information still could be exempt from
disclosure under the FOIA even though it had once been public.33'
Summaries of disciplinary proceedings against Air Force cadets might
still be exempt under the FOIA's exception for "clearly unwarranted"
invasions of personal privacy33 2 even though they had once been
posted on Air Force Academy bulletin boards, the Court held. Justice
Brennan wrote: "Despite the summaries' distribution within the
Academy, many of this group with earlier access to summaries may
never have identified a particular cadet, or may have wholly forgotten
his encounter with Academy discipline. And the risk to the privacy
interest of a former cadet . . . cannot be rejected as trivial." 333
The Court also recognized a statutory privacy exemption in the
1989 case of Justice Department v. Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press.33 4 In Reporters Committee, members of the media sought
criminal record compilations ("rap sheets") of an organized crime fig-
ure from the FBI's computer banks.3"
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens held that the rap sheets
fell under FOIA exemption seven for law enforcement information
constituting an "unwarranted invasion of privacy" and denied the
disclosure request.33 "[B]oth the common law and the literal under-
330. Id. at 465.
331. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
332. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
333. Rose, 425 U.S. at 380-81.
334. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
335. Id. at 757.
336. Id. at 780. See also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
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standings of privacy encompass the individual's control of informa-
tion concerning his or her person," 337 Justice Stevens wrote. He
buttressed his conclusion by citing Whalen and the Privacy Act.3 38
Justice Stevens distinguished computerized record summaries and
the individual records the summaries contained:
Recognition of [an informational] privacy interest supports the
distinction, in terms of personal privacy, between scattered
disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and
revelation of the rap sheet as a whole .... Plainly there is a vast
difference between the public records that might be found after a
diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police
stations throughout the country and a computerized summary
located in a single clearinghouse of information. 39
Justice Stevens acknowledged that all the crime figures' arrests were
or may have been public records. He cited Rose for the proposition
that individual privacy interests may not disappear just because infor-
mation requested was once public.314 "The substantial character of [an
informational privacy] interest is affected by the fact that in today's
society the computer can accumulate and store information that
would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person at-
tains the age of 80, when the FBI's rap sheets are discarded," Stevens
wrote .
34
Reporters Committee is a significant case on access and privacy in
the computer age. Although the actual holding is based on the FOIA
exemption for law enforcement records, the language that distin-
guishes individual records and computer compilations could easily ap-
ply in other contexts.
The FOIA law-enforcement exemption that Justice Stevens used to
deny the disclosure request requires balancing the individual privacy
interest in non-disclosure against the public interest in the release of
the records. 42 In Reporters Committee the crime figure whose rap
sheets were sought allegedly had ties to a corrupt congressman. The
rap sheets might have shed light on the crime figure's dealings with
the congressman, if any, or yielded other information of public inter-
est. It is difficult, then, to see why the Supreme Court used Reporters
Committee to declare that rap sheets were categorically exempt from
disclosure.
337. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 763.
338. Id. at 766-71 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (1988)).
339. Id. at 764.
340. Id. at 767-69.
341. Id. at771.
342. Id. at 762.
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Privacy advocates have reason to be concerned about the computer-
ization of records. At the same time, however, access advocates have
reason to be concerned about results like that in Reporters Commit-
tee. Courts may act reasonably to protect privacy, but they also may
use computerization of records as a broad shibboleth to limit public
record disclosure laws. Whether Reporters Committee fosters sensible
treatment of computerized records or is used to thwart the FOIA's
general policy of disclosure remains to be seen.
E. State Cases on Computer Access and Privacy
Because the Supreme Court has not declared a constitutional right
to informational privacy, most general privacy law is left to the states.
Some states have explicit constitutional provisions protecting a per-
son's right to privacy. 343 Interpretations of these provisions vary.
Many have been advanced in search-and-seizure cases, but some also
have been invoked in informational privacy cases.
As in Rose and Reporters Committee, the privacy exemptions have
been used in some states to decide computer privacy cases. An issue
that most commonly arises in state computer cases is whether com-
puter records pose a greater threat to privacy than other forms of re-
cords. Courts have reached mixed conclusions.
As early as 1972, shortly after commentaries warning about the
threat of computerized records began to appear, the Colorado Su-
preme Court acknowledged the threat in Davidson v. Dill.34 In David-
son a lower court dismissed the plaintiff's effort to expunge arrest
records under a common-law invasion of privacy claim.14
In reversing the lower court, the court noted the impact of comput-
ers on privacy:
Recent years have witnessed a substantial upsurge in the number of
cases and commentaries dealing with the problem before this Court.
In no small part, this phenomenon is due to the advent of the
computer age-an event which has drastically increased the power of
industry and government to collect data-and the growing concern
for the individual's loss of privacy as a natural by-product of our
modern technology.3"
343. See, e.g., ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. !, § 1;
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CoNsT. art 1, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
344. 503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972).
345. Id. at 158.
346. Id.
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The court also mentioned that arrest files were traded with other
police data centers, including those of the FBI. After concluding that
retention of the files could collide with the emerging right of pri-
vacy,34 7 the court remanded the case.ADavidson demonstrates that state courts have not waited for federal
guidance in the treatment of computerized records. If anything, some
state courts recognized the potential for privacy invasion created by
computerization before Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court did.
In 1982 in Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University,349 the Michi-
gan Supreme Court held disclosure of a computerized record would
constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of . . .privacy" under the
Michigan counterpart to the federal FOIA.3 50 The litigation in Kesten-
baum began when a student brought suit to compel release of a dupli-
cate computer tape containing the names and addresses of Michigan
State University students.35' The tape was used to produce the univers-
ity's directory. 5 2
The court rejected the disclosure request even though the names of
the students ultimately would appear in the student directory. "Form,
not just content, affects the nature of information," the court wrote.
"Seemingly benign data in an intrusive form takes on quite different
characteristics than if it were merely printed." '353 Students did not
know when they registered "that an efficient and intrusive computer
mailing system already was available to anyone for a nominal sum,"
the court said. 35 4
In Kestenbaum the court might have been concerned that the com-
puter tape would make it easy for the plaintiff to contact the students
in bothersome ways. For example, it might have been used to auto-
matically produce a mailing list.3" But the opinion never explained
how the computer tape would have been different from a copy of the
student directory. On the facts, then, it seems a weak case for non-
disclosure.
347. Id. at 160.
348. Id. After Davidson, the Colorado Legislature passed the Criminal Justice Records Act,
which provided that records could be sealed and not reopened except by court order. COLO. REv.
STAT. § 24-72-803 (1992). Thus the possibility of having records destroyed is no longer likely in
Colorado. Davidson is discussed not for its result, but for its concern about computerized re-
cords.
349. 327 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. 1982).
350. Id. at 785.
351. Id. at 783.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 789.
354. Id. at 790.
355. Kestenbaum was the president of a registered student political organization. Id. at 783.
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Two years later, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied a records
request for a computer tape held by the Detroit police on the same
grounds. In Mullin v. Detroit Police Department the plaintiff sought a
computer tape containing the names and addresses of people involved
in Detroit traffic accidents since 1980.356 The information was in the
public record in the form of 70,000 individual accident reports.
5 7
The appeals court said "this case falls squarely within Kesten-
baum" and held disclosure would be a "clearly unwarranted invasion
of privacy.'"'35 The case was actually a stronger one for nondisclosure
than Kestenbaum, the court reasoned, because the accident reports
contained embarrassing facts such as the names of people arrested. 5 9
Thus, the appeals court adopted Kestenbaum's distinction between the
privacy implications of computerized and paper records.
Courts have also used privacy to block release of driver's license
records. In the 1988 Massachusetts case of Doe v. Registrar of Motor
Vehicles, an appeals court vacated a lower court decision allowing dis-
closure of such records. 36° The appeals court put the burden on the
records custodian to show the information was not "personal data"
under the state's Fair Information Practices Act.3 61 The court stated:
Even if the items here at issue are not considered "intimate details of
highly personal nature," the aggregate effect on the privacy of the
total number of people whose data are disseminated weighs against
disclosure .... There is a negative public interest in placing the
private affairs of so many individuals in computer banks available
for public scrutiny. 362
These cases demonstrate that some state courts have recognized that
the volume of data and retrieval speed unique to computer records
creates novel privacy problems. However, many courts have not fol-
lowed this reasoning. Many courts have simply found that computer
records are public records just as paper records and have allowed ac-
cess to computer records to the same extent as paper.
In Webb v. City of Shreveport a Louisiana appeals court granted a
request for a computer tape containing names and addresses of public
356. 348 N.W.2d 708, 710 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
357. Id. at 712.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. 528 N.E.2d 880, 888-89 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 886. For a decision barring disclosure of driver's license information on state
constitutional invasion of privacy grounds, see Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 721
P.2d 50 (Cal. 1986).
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employees in Shreveport. 3 The records were available as public re-
cords in other forms. Thus, there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the names and addresses3" that would violate the Louisiana
Constitution's privacy provision.3 65 The court did not explicitly con-
sider whether the computer tapes had a special privacy-invasive char-
acter.366
The New York case of Szikszay v. Buelow gave computer records
similar treatment. 67 In Szikszay the plaintiff sought county computer
tapes containing the names and addresses of the owners of each parcel
of land in Cattaraugus County.3 " An Erie County court held the tapes
were subject to disclosure under the New York Freedom of Informa-
tion Law. 69 The court held there was no unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy under the state records law and thus the records were public.3 70 A
distinction between computerized and paper records was explicitly re-
jected. "The form of the records and petitioner's purpose in seeking
them do not alter their public character or petitioner's concomitant
right to inspect and copy," the court wrote.3 7'
A 1982 Kansas case also treated computerized records like those in
any other form. In State ex rel. Stephan v. Harder the Kansas Su-
preme Court was asked to consider whether denial of access to abor-
tion records was proper.37 2 The records contained the names of
physicians who were paid public funds to perform abortions .17 The
computer tapes were required to be maintained and kept by law as
Kansas public records law provided, 374 and thus were public records,
the court held.3" The court also ruled that severing confidential por-
tions of the records did not make them "new records" under the law
because the record custodians were under an implied duty to delete the
confidential information.176 Finally, the court held that any privacy
363. 371 So. 2d 316, 317 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
364. Id. at 319.
365. "Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures or invasions of privacy." LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 5.
366. 371 So. 2d at 318.
367. 436 N.Y.S.2d 558 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
368. Id. at 559.
369. Id. at 563.
370. Id. (quoting N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §§ 87 subd. 2(b), 89 subd. 2(b)(iii) (McKinney 1988)).
371. Id.
372. 641 P.2d 366 (Kan. 1982).
373. Id. at 368.
374. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-201 (1982)).
375. Id. at 372.
376. Id. at 374.
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concerns were outweighed by the public's right to know about the
workings of government.
377
F. Privacy and Computer Access in Florida
Florida's public records law3 78 is one of the broadest in the nation.
It has possibly the strongest presumption favoring disclosure of gov-
ernment records of any state. The Florida Supreme Court has ruled
that only "those records that are provided by statutory law to be con-
fidential or which are expressly exempted by general or special law"
are exempt from disclosure. 379 Generally, Florida courts have subordi-
nated privacy interests to public access by giving the records act the
broadest possible expression. 30
Florida's constitution contains a provision specifically protecting in-
dividual privacy. 3 ' In 1980 Florida voters adopted a provision that
reads: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the pub-
lic's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by
law.1132 On the strength of the last sentence, the Florida Supreme
Court has held the privacy provision does not bar disclosure of public
records.383
In 1980 the Florida Supreme Court decided a case that seemed to
foreclose any implicit state or federal constitutional privacy interest
that might prevent access to records. In Shevin v. Byron, Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Associates, Inc., the court confronted a claim that
papers prepared by a consultant assisting in a personnel search were
not subject to disclosure on federal and state constitutional privacy
grounds.8 4 The Shevin court rejected these arguments, holding that
the federal informational privacy interest was not sufficiently devel-
oped by the U.S. Supreme Court.38 The Florida court also concluded
that there was "no support in the language of any provision of the
Florida Constitution or in the judicial decisions of this state" for a
state informational privacy right to override access to records .316
377. Id. at 376.
378. See FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (1991).
379. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d. 420, 422 (Fla. 1979).
380. Lorei v. Smith, 464 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 475 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1985).
381. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
382. Id.
383. Forsberg v. Housing Auth. of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla. 1984).
384. 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
385. Id. at 637-38.
386. Id. at 639.
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However, in a 1992 non-computer case, the Florida Supreme Court
suggested that there may be privacy interests of third parties that
could limit access to records, at least in criminal discovery proceed-
ings. The court in Post Newsweek Stations v. Doe affirmed a lower
court ruling that barred an attempt by third parties to have the re-
cords disclosed.38 7 The court, in dicta, did not rule out the possibility
of closing public records generated in criminal discovery based on pri-
vacy concerns."'
VII. CONCLUSION
Computers present perhaps the greatest opportunity since the print-
ing press to make vast quantities of information available to the aver-
age person. This information explosion includes records of
government-records that allow citizens to actively supervise the per-
formance of both elected officials and bureaucrats. Ironically, the
very mechanism that could provide such enhanced access to informa-
tion is in some cases being used to limit access.
Agencies that are required to provide access to their records have
sometimes used the new technology to avoid disclosure. Agencies may
not design systems with access in mind, only to claim later that infor-
mation is unavailable because "our computer can't do that." Agen-
cies have also frequently balked at providing information in the
format most useful to the requester.
Judicial reaction to computerized records has been mixed. While
some courts have held that computerized records are no less public
records than those on paper, other courts, perhaps evincing some fear
of the new technology, have reacted less favorably. For example,
some courts have been reluctant to allow requesters to choose a partic-
ular format for receiving information, even if information in the de-
sired form would be relatively simple for the agency to produce.
Perhaps the greatest battle for those seeking access to computerized
records is over requests that may be perceived to invade individual
privacy. This issue, to which there are no easy answers, will likely con-
tinue to haunt access advocates.
However, many other issues are currently being debated in the
courts and legislatures, including in the state of Florida. Many policies
affecting computer records are likely to be adopted in the near future.
For example, the Florida Bureau of Archives and Records Manage-
ment, a division of the Department of State, recently adopted rules
387. 17 Fla. Law Weekly 715 (Fla. Nov. 25, 1992).
388. Id. at 717.
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for public records that must be kept for more than ten years. The
rules require that state agencies obtain computer systems that ade-
quately provide public access to records and provide requesters with
information in the form they choose, if it is available. 8 9 Agencies also
are required to define the contents of their long-term computerized
records and shall not ordinarily enter into a contract or obligation
that "impairs the right of the public under state law to inspect or copy
the agency's nonexempt public records." 319 The bureau has begun a
rulemaking proceeding to consider access provisions for other com-
puterized records.
In addition, a subcommittee of Florida's Growth Management Data
Network Coordinating Council, established by the Office of the Gov-
ernor to manage the sharing of computer data related to growth man-
agement among the state's agencies, has issued a report with several
recommendations for access to computerized records.39 ' The recom-
mendations include amending the state's public records statute to re-
quire government agencies to design computer systems that facilitate
access and creating a Public Records Council within the Department
of State to address public access policy.3 92 Even further, however, the
Florida Legislature was considering in the spring of 1993 legislation
that would allow government agencies to impose fees for copies of
some computer records tosubsidize the development and maintenance
of sophisticated computer systems.
As a preliminary step toward framing the debate on computer-ac-
cess ideas, the authors of this Article suggest a set of computer-access
criteria. All the recommendations are based on the underlying as-
sumption that access should not be restricted simply because records
are in a computer. On the contrary, the principles that have guided
federal and state access laws demand that government use the com-
puter to enhance the people's right to know. The authors compiled the
following thirteen recommendations after discussions with reporters,
computer technicians, lawyers interested in freedom of information,
legislative staff, and government records managers. Some of them
parallel recommendations made by such organizations as the Ameri-
can Library Association3 93 and the American Bar Association.3 94 Many
389. FLA. ADMIN. CODEANN. r. IB-26.003(6)(f)(3) (1992).
390. Id.
391. OFFICE OF THE Gov., REPORT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT DATA
NETWORK COORDINATING COUNCIL'S SUBCOMMITTEE ON FLORIDA'S PuBtIc RECORDS LAW (Dec.
1992).
392. Id. at 53, 55-56.
393. Principles of Public Information Policy, 55 Fed. Reg. 12751 (1990).
394. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PUBLIC ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT ELECTRONIC INFORMATION UN-
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of the ideas are based on current state and federal access laws. Some
of the ideas, to the best of the authors' knowledge, are original.
The authors recommend:
1. Federal, state, and local governments must promote public access
needs when agencies install or upgrade computer systems. Public ac-
cess can be built into a system at the design stage at little additional
cost. If public access is built into a system, records custodians cannot
deny access based on the cost of reprogramming the computer. When
public access is built in up front, access to computerized records is
actually cheaper than searches for corresponding paper files.
2. All information in government-owned and operated computers is
a public record, absent specific statutory exemptions. Defining the
scope of public access should remain the prerogative of elected repre-
sentatives after open discussion in the public arena. Access exemp-
tions should not be declared ad hoc by government agencies or by the
courts.
3. Any government agency that uses computerized records should
make nonexempt information available to the public through user-
friendly computer terminals. In the long run, providing access to the
public records will be cheaper if self-service terminals are provided.
Easy-to-follow instructions for public terminals should be available.
Database security is a legitimate concern, but systems can be designed
so the public can only read, and not alter, the information.
4. Government agencies using computerized records should make
available to the public a catalog of nonexempt public information
stored in computers. Effective organization and indexing required by
such cataloging will increase agency efficiency as well as enhance pub-
lic understanding of government.
5. Content-based exemptions for withholding computer records
should be the same as for paper files. In general, information that was
public record in paper files ought to be public record in computer
files. The public policy issues do not substantially change. Any rea-
sons for exempting computerized records based on content must be
thoroughly documented and must not be based on unsubstantiated
fears of technology.
6. Information in computers not specifically exempted by statute
should not be withheld on the grounds that it is mixed with exempt
DER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (Feb. 1990); see also Sandra D. Scott, Computer Tech-
nology v. Laws on Access (unpublished paper, presented to the Association for Education in
Journalism and Mass Communication annual convention, Boston, Mass., Aug. 1991); FLORIDA
Soc'y OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF ACCESS TO COMPUTERIZED
RECORDS, reprinted in Guidelines Developed for Access to Government Computer Data, BRE-
CHNER REP. (Brechner Ctr. for Freedom of Info., Univ. of Fla.), Sept. 1992, at 4.
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
information. If public access is built into government computer sys-
tems, deleting exempt information is far easier using a properly de-
signed computer than by reading and editing paper documents.
Segregating materials by computer would save the government signifi-
cant amounts of employee time.
7. Computerized information created or used by a government offi-
cial as part of his or her official duties must be available to the public
unless specifically exempted by statute. Only drafts of documents that
are incomplete or not intended for dissemination should be exempt
from disclosure.
8. Information in government computers cannot be withheld on the
ground that the information is not available in paper form or because
no official has used or seen the information. Producing a printed doc-
ument from computer data or copying that information onto a mag-
netic tape is not "creating a record" in the sense the term is applied to
paper records. The government was not expected to create paper doc-
uments to satisfy record requests because of the potential burden on
agencies. However, information in a computer already exists as a gov-
ernment record. To deny public access to computerized information
the government is using would create a vast new exemption to public
records laws-an exemption that could subvert the very purpose of
access laws.
9. Computer software made and used by government is a matter of
public record. For example, the software that determines how income
tax data are manipulated is as important as other records of tax-col-
lecting agencies.
10. Agencies must release computerized information in the form re-
quested when they are capable of doing so. Currently, many agencies
give requesters paper printouts that are more expensive to produce
than providing records on disk or magnetic tape. Requesters receiving
paper records often have to input the data into digital form, a step
that is unnecessary, time-consuming, and extremely costly. Govern-
ment should facilitate the use of information, rather than frustrate it,
whenever possible. Until the time comes when access is routinely built
into government computers, agencies should, for example, copy data
in their computers onto tapes or disks provided by the requesters, at
cost. In addition, agencies should be encouraged to make computer-
ized information available through remote access.
11. The public may only be charged the actual cost of reproducing
government-held computerized information unless extensive employee
and computer time is required. At no time should government charge
more than the actual cost of materials, labor, and computer time.
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12. Costs of government documents should not be a barrier to ac-
cess, even when government records are provided by private informa-
tion providers. Government needs to ensure that the costs of
government records available only through commercial vendors are
kept reasonable. The costs of government information available only
through commercial vendors is already a problem, and will only get
worse. The average citizen may be priced out of the information mar-
ket if steps are not taken to prevent escalating costs.
13. Governments should ensure that all records are maintained in a
form that can be accessed through available technology. Documents
in archives may have to be transferred to a contemporary format if
there is a risk that the technology required to read them could become
obsolete. Governments are already reporting that documents in ar-
chives cannot be accessed because machines no longer exist to read
them. This problem will grow with constantly changing computer
technology.
Access to computerized information presents different problems
than those associated with access to paper files. If would-be requesters
do not begin to demand the same level of access to computer files they
now have to paper files, hard-won privileges of access may vanish.
Most of the protections listed above, in one form or another, need to
find their way into access law.
